Followers of political history might keep an eye ajar this weekend when members of Alberta's fourth party vote to merge with the latest creation of a province renowned as an intellectual incubator.Awaiting the 75-per-cent approval of their membership are the newborn Wildrose party and the Alberta Alliance, whose blue and green colours are an obvious display of affection for the old Canadian Alliance and Reform parties. The Alberta Alliance gained its first MLA in 2004, when Edmonton Norwood's Gary Masyk crossed the floor to the opposition benches after a falling-out with the Conservative government.Mr. Masyk did not return to the legislature after the election several months later but, interestingly enough, the Alliance did when the people of Cardston-Taber-Warner elected Paul Hinman as their MLA. He has served as the Alliance's leader ever since and - notwithstanding the Alliance's open courtship of Preston Manning - is designated to be the new Wildrose Alliance Party leader in the next provincial election, expected in March.With a little puck luck, Mr. Hinman could have had a couple of companions in the legislature. His party closely contested a number of rural ridings in 2004 and more often than not finished third in Calgary, ahead of the New Democrats. Overall, the Alliance snagged 9 per cent of the popular vote despite virtually no media profile, compared to the well-exposed New Democrats, whose 10-per-cent share of the popular vote translated into four MLAs, all from Edmonton.But while the Alliance may have the hearts of many of Alberta's true conservatives, as they like to call themselves, conventional wisdom is that it is not sufficiently resourced to be able to grow.Enter the Wildrose Party, which by late 2007 had gathered enough signatures to qualify for official party status. It has drawn the allegiance of a number of credible people from outside the two big cities. But its best known face is that of Link Byfield, erstwhile magazine publisher, columnist, senator-elect and generally respected purveyor of Alberta ideas and causes. Eschewing positions on hot-button social issues, Wildrose has focused on an agenda favouring small government, low taxes and policy innovations, such as the creation of an Alberta Pension Plan. Even those who may not share the Wildrose world view will find them a relatively straightforward read.A smooth merger cannot be assumed. After all, the downside of parties of principle, whether their cause be left, right or environmental, is that the strength of their principles creates an organic disability when it comes to what some call compromise and others refer to as moral flexibility.Should these two small fish emerge as one, they will still be a small fish, one likely to poll in the 12-per-cent range. While clearly siphoning voters that once formed the vanguard of the Klein Revolution away from the Progressive Conservatives, this is not enough to constitute a threat to gain power. But - similar to the NDP - this pull is enough to form a principled power proposition that would force those in the "middle," such as the opposition Liberals and governing Conservatives, to create a stronger policy identity than they might otherwise.In fact, a successful merger creates the possibility that, similar to the Saskatchewan Party to the east, the Wildrose Alliance might be the start of Alberta's Next Big Thing. This is a province, after all, that spawned the CCF, United Farmers and Reform. Not all new ideas succeed as well as those did, but the culture here has always been more open than most to considering new options. And, remember, when change comes to Alberta, which admittedly isn't often, it always comes from beyond the status quo.This probably isn't the moment of that change. But it could be the occasion that starts the process that leads to the moment. Just in case it is, it's worth staying awake for.

This article originally appeared in Appeal #13, pp. 28-50Abstract In a time where the influx of immigrants with diverse religions conflict with the laws of the majority, the question of how to live together in disagreement when Charter rights collide goes to the heart of pluralism, the 'common good' and the modern liberal exercise in Canada. The recent debates over sharia tribunals, faith-based education, same-sex marriage, and the accommodation of religious marriage commissioners illustrate the difficulties in balancing the religious and 'secular' in the public sphere. This paper looks to liberal theory, freedom of religion jurisprudence, and contemporary thinkers for answers to these timely questions. It advocates for a more deferential, accommodating form of liberalism along the principles of modus vivendi where individual rights are limited only to the extent that they infringe on the rights of others. By moving away from the vague, all-encompassing language of "Charter values" to John Stuart Mill's harm principle, we create a more pluralistic public sphere that gives reasons for religious minorities and ethnic groups to reciprocate such tolerance and participate actively in civil society. If we relegate such views to the private sphere by imposing a 'rational consensus' on a divided public, we do so at our peril. For it will further fragment the civic fabric of Canadian society into scattered islands of faith communities, leaving all sectors impoverished.Introduction Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures; it is the political expression of one range of cultures and quite incompatible with other ranges. . . Liberalism is also a fighting creed1 —Charles TaylorHere I stand, I can do no other2 —Martin LutherOn the 25th anniversary of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"), the entrenchment of individual rights, the strategic litigation that followed and the policy-laden decisions of the Supreme Court have left some groups rejoicing with others shaking their heads (and pulpits). The rights of women,3 gays and lesbians,4 official language minorities5 and the criminally accused6 have arguably been accelerated beyond what reluctant legislatures would have enacted. On the other hand, the Charter has largely been a disappointment for a range of sectors like poverty advocates,7 law enforcement,8 racialized groups9 and many religious groups.10 Religious leaders would have been shocked had they known in 1982 that this liberal rights document would be the catalyst, and in some cases impetus, for extending civil marriage to gays and lesbians, quashing a school board's decision not to license books depicting homosexual relationships, compelling a religious private printer to serve a gay advocacy organization, and striking down legislation that prohibited Sunday trading. The development of freedom of religion jurisprudence under the Charter has left the Canadian state, judiciary, and society at large grappling with some fundamental questions. How do we balance the equality rights of gays and lesbians asserted under s. 15 with the religious freedoms of marriage commissioners protected under s. 2(a)? How can we reconcile temporal and divine sources of authority when the rule of law and the supremacy of God collide? How can a "secular" state encourage religious diversity, pluralism and the "common good"? Such questions depend on how they are framed and how we define and understand liberalism, pluralism, the 'secular' and the rule of law. In a time where the rights of same-sex couples and the freedoms of religious groups have come to a head, and where the influx of immigrants with diverse religions conflict with the laws of the majority, this question of how we live together in disagreement goes to the heart of pluralism, the 'common good' and the modern liberal exercise in Canada. In this paper, I will argue that the best way of accommodating different faiths, cultures and worldviews when rights collide is a modus vivendi approach, as articulated by John Gray.11 Modus vivendi is a more honest, accommodating and genuinely tolerant face of liberalism, which seeks pluralistic, peaceful coexistence as its end goal as opposed to a rational consensus dictated by the judiciary in the name of all-encompassing "Charter values." Indeed, liberalism itself was borne out of a theory of the common good that was focused on the individual, free from interference and imposition by the sovereign, the Church or the state. That said, the judiciary does have a duty to mediate this pluralism by ensuring that the assertion of the rights of one individual does not infringe on the rights of another. In delineating that fine line in the sand, this paper will advocate a return to John Stuart Mill's harm principle—using individual rights as deliberative markers of harm. In the conflict between claims of same-sex equality and religious freedom—be it in public education, civil marriage or private businesses—the adversarial, winner-take-all litigation model is poorly designed for peaceful coexistence and should be used as a last resort only when individual rights have been infringed. It is the realm of civil society that is better suited for not simply tolerating difference, but understanding and embracing it. Part I of this paper will canvas the ideas of liberal theorists John Gray, Charles Taylor,12 and John Stuart Mill.13 Part II will examine the freedom of religion jurisprudence in the pre and post- Charter era with respect to Sunday closing laws, residential by-laws, and same-sex equality claims in civil marriage, public education and private businesses. Part III will analyze the Canadian experience of attempting to balance so-called "secular" liberalism and religious freedom, drawing on the writings of Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin,14 Jean Bethke Elsthtain,15 Iain T. Benson,16 Bruce MacDougall,17 and Benjamin Berger.18 Part IV will look at some contemporary examples in Canada like the tension between same-sex civil marriage and religious marriage commissioners, and present the case for a more inclusive, pluralistic liberalism where Charter rights of religious freedom and equality collide.Part I: The Changing Faces of Liberalism Liberalism is one of the most commonly used, yet least understood, concepts in politics and law. Part of the problem lies in its very definition, which varies widely based on different theorists, countries and time periods. This paper does not attempt to explain or reconcile the myriad understandings of liberalism but rather to juxtapose the ideas of certain theorists with contemporary issues in Canada and challenge some of the "liberal" assumptions underlying recent jurisprudence. Liberalism's common features include the high valuation of individual reason, liberty and agency, with an understanding of law as a tool to limit the state's interference in the lives of the individual.19 Liberalism seeks to respect individual moral thought, free from moral or epistemological claims of "truth." However, where these commonly-held views diverge is in the interpretation of tolerance, universal values, and the growing challenge of cultural pluralism. In this paper, I will attempt to illustrate how the "liberal" judicial treatment of civic or Charter values has moved us away from the classical liberal tenets of individual autonomy and negative liberty into the imposition of a societal consensus of the "common good" as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada (the "SCC"). In Two Faces of Liberalism, John Gray presents two contradictory principles that lie at the heart of liberal tolerance. He summarizes these conflicting faces of liberalism as follows: In one, toleration is justified as a means to truth. In this view toleration is an instrument of rational consensus, and a diversity of ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to disappear. In the other, toleration is valued as a condition of peace, and divergent ways of living are welcomed as marks of diversity.20In the first view, "rational consensus" liberalism is rooted in the enlightenment project of a universal civilization. From this perspective, "liberal toleration is the pursuit of an ideal form of life."21 This is the language of universal values or human rights, which has greatly impacted international law in the last fifty years. In Canada, these are articulated as "Charter values" or "civic values" like security, dignity and autonomy. According to Gray, this liberalism of a universal regime is supported by such theorists as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and in more recent times, John Rawls and F.A. Hayek. Arguably, Ronald Dworkin, one of the chief proponents of Rawls' conception of liberalism, should also be included on this list. In the second view, modus vivendi liberalism is rooted in the peaceful coexistence of warring communities and different ways of life. Modus vivendi embodies an older current of liberal thought about toleration in expressing the belief that there are many forms of life in which humans can thrive.22 The aim here is not for convergence or the "good life", but rather to reconcile individuals and ways of life honouring conflicting values to a life in common.23 According to Gray, theorists like Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Isaiah Berlin and Michael Oakeshott have expressed this liberalism of peaceful coexistence. As I will explain in greater detail in Part III, this modus vivendi approach is particularly salient in the Canadian context, not only because of the influx of immigrants with diverse faith backgrounds, but because of Canada's "neutral but supportive" position with respect to religious groups. This complex reality is ill served by the false dichotomies of church vs. state, religious vs. secular, the rule of law vs. the supremacy of God and public vs. private religious expression. Far from being mutually exclusive, the accommodation and encouragement of diverse faiths in a pluralistic public sphere can actually strengthen civil society and the social fabric of Canada. Relegating religious views to the private sphere creates the illusion of a secular society where equality reigns supreme. In reality, it will only serve to further isolate, alienate and fragment religious groups in the dark corners of Canada's mosques, churches, synagogues and temples, far removed from public scrutiny, accountability and a common space to live together in disagreement. As a deeply multicultural society built on immigrants of a diversity of ethnic backgrounds, how we understand liberalism in Canada has profound impacts on citizenship, religion and the rule of law. Writing from the Canadian experience, Charles Taylor is critical of the purported neutrality and comprehensiveness of liberal claims, arguing that "[l]iberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures; it is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges. . .[l]iberalism is also a fighting creed."24 Taylor suggests that people are always acting and finding meaning in a normative context. Therefore, what is considered as the "good" in a liberal polity reflects a certain cultural reality and is poorly designed to meet the challenge of contemporary cultural pluralism. Taylor's view of a liberal society is "one that is trying to realize in the highest degree certain goods or principles or right."25 However, the concept of the good life is deeply value-laden and in a society that is getting more multicultural by the day, Taylor advocates for ethically richer notions of liberalism to meet the demands of such diversity. It is precisely this claim of comprehensiveness, recently espoused by Chief Justice McLachlin with respect to the constitutional rule of law,26 which jars against individual freedom, religious faith, and the submission of devout adherents to an entirely different worldview that cannot simply be relegated to the private sphere. However, if we see liberalism for what it really is — one of many ideological frameworks based in a specific cultural context with its accompanying normative assumptions—we can begin to enlarge the debate and the public sphere to better accommodate religious and cultural groups. Once again, the goal here should not be societal consensus with the SCC as the vehicle for "secular" liberalism, but an expansive pluralism that is limited only by Mill's harm principle. Much guidance can be found in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, one of the foundational texts on liberalism that remains highly influential in any rights discourse. Mill was primarily concerned by the exercise of power by society over an individual. He is credited as the first to articulate the harm principle in order to delineate the limitations on the rights and freedoms of the state in respect to individuals, and of individuals in respect to each other: The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-preservation. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.27Mill believed that the individual was sovereign over his own body and mind and he should not be compelled to do what is considered wise, right or moral in the eyes of others. This idea that the rights and freedoms of an individual or group only extend until they infringe on the rights of others has been fundamental to contemporary liberal societies and the rights revolution in Canada. Only by critically examining the historical treatment of liberalism in the writings of theorists like Mill, Gray and Taylor, can we fully understand, and indeed challenge, the values underlying freedom of religion jurisprudence outlined in Part II. As I will explain in greater detail in Part IV, by moving away from the vague language of Charter values to Mill's harm principle, we follow a more honest conception of liberalism that searches for a way of living together in disagreement to better accommodate competing rights in the public sphere.Part II: Freedom of Religion Jurisprudence in Canada To fully understand Canada's "neutral yet supportive" approach to religious groups, a historical analysis of the statutory, constitutional and common law protections of religious freedoms is necessary. With the religious conflicts of the Old World still fresh in the minds of colonial powers, Canada's early history was marked by a robust protection for Protestants and Catholics. The roots of these protections can be traced back to the Articles of Capitulation for Quebec (1759) and Montreal (1760), which granted the inhabitants of the cities "the free exercise of the Roman religion."28 The Treaty of Paris (1763), which put an end to imperial wars in Canada, clearly affirmed the rights of Roman Catholics in Quebec. This was further articulated in the Quebec Act (1774), which expanded religious freedom by replacing the oath of allegiance's reference to the Protestant faith, guaranteeing the free exercise of the Roman Catholic faith (more protection than was given to Catholics in England!) and empowering the Crown to support the Protestant religion and clergy. And although the British North America Act (1867) had no specific freedom of religion provision, s. 93 did entrench the protection of minority Roman Catholic and Protestant schools in Ontario and Quebec. The mid-20th century witnessed a dark chapter in Canada's history for religious groups like the Doukhobors in British Columbia29 and Jehovah's Witnesses in Quebec under Premier Maurice Duplessis. In a series of events beginning in the 1930s up until the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the challenges faced by Jehovah's Witnesses at the hands of Quebec police, municipalities and provincial governments were indicative of Canada's early history of religious freedom. The cases that followed illustrated the need for a constitutional remedy to limit the powers of the state. In Saumur v. City of Quebec,30 a Jehovah's Witness challenged the validity of a by-law of the City of Quebec forbidding distribution of any book, pamphlet, booklet, circular or tract without permission from the Chief of Police. The SCC overturned the decisions at the trial and appellate levels by ruling that the by-law did not extend so as to prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing their writings. Rand J. established religious freedom as a "principle of fundamental character" and stated the following: Freedom of speech, religion and the inviolability of the person, are original freedoms which are at once the necessary attributes and modes of selfexpression of human beings and the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order.31Thus, religion is interpreted as being much more than mere choice, but rather a fundamental aspect of identity, community and self-expression. This expansive view of religion stands in stark contrast to later Charter decisions like Brockie (before being overturned on this point by the Ontario Divisional Court) and Chamberlain which would restrict religion to the private sphere or to the realm of belief and not action whenever it conflicts with Charter values. I would argue that this view of the comprehensiveness of religious adherence better serves the current debate over conflicting rights which has tended to reduce religious beliefs to one of many rational choices that must be measured against, and limited by, Charter values. A landmark constitutional case involving religious freedom is Roncarelli v. Duplessis.32 The plaintiff Roncarelli, a Montreal restaurant owner, had his liquor license cancelled at the instigation of Premier Maurice Duplessis after he had acted as bailsman for a number of Jehovah's Witnesses charged with violating municipal by-laws prohibiting the distribution of religious literature. Rand J, in his oft-cited reasons for the majority judgement, ruled that Duplessis had exceeded his official powers and the unwritten constitutional principle of the rule of law meant no public official was above the law. As a result of Saumur and Roncarelli v. Duplessis, the SCC had given implicit constitutional status to freedom of religion, limited only by rational laws of general application. These early cases reflected a more pluralistic liberalism by limiting Duplessis' vision of the "common good" in favour of common institutions that promoted the peaceful coexistence of Jehovah's Witnesses and the Catholic majority in Quebec's public sphere. They also underlined a tension between religious freedom and the laws of the majority that is still playing itself out today. As we will see, the Charter jurisprudence has been far from clear, though the recent SCC decisions in Amselem33 and Multani34 appear to be returning to a more expansive interpretation of religious freedom with a duty of reasonable accommodation.The Scope and Content of Religious Freedom in the Charter Era After the disappointing jurisprudence following the enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights,35 the Charter articulated Pierre Elliott Trudeau's vision for a constitutionally entrenched individual rights document to unite the country, limit state power and provide the legal protections for a flourishing multicultural society. Following on from the practices of many countries (and in keeping with international human rights doctrine), Canada entrenched a rights document with explicit protections for freedom of religion in a number of places. Religious freedom is upheld in s. 2(a), as well as s. 15 which prohibits discrimination based on religious grounds. Even the Charter preamble itself evokes religious doctrine in establishing that "Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law."36 Although certain commentators and judges have dismissed the supremacy of God as a "dead letter. . .that can only be resurrected by the Supreme Court of Canada",37 its conjunctive inclusion alongside the rule of law speaks to its continuing relevance in our "secular" state, as has been argued by Iain T. Benson.38 Other commentators have also criticized the "dead letter" approach as failing to give proper weight to the history, purpose and relevance of the Charter's preamble.39 According to Bruce Ryder,40 the supremacy of God is best understood as a reminder of the state's role in not just respecting the autonomy of faith communities, but also in nurturing and supporting them in an even-handed manner.41 Following along this line, Gonthier J., writing for Bastarache J. and himself in the Chamberlain dissent, referred to the preamble as having interpretive weight for a more religiously inclusive conception of the "secular" when he notes that "the preamble to the Charter itself establishes that ". . .Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law."42 The scope and content of s. 2(a) was first articulated in Big M. Drug Mart, a leading authority on freedom of religion in Canada. The respondent grocery store, Big M Drug Mart, challenged the Federal Lord's Day Act43 that prohibited retailers from carrying on business on a Sunday. The SCC held that since the purpose of the Lord's Day Act was to compel religious observance of a sectarian Christian ideal, it violated the religious freedom of non-Christian Canadians under s. 2(a) and was not saved by s. 1. In his reasons, Dickson C.J. expressed the core of religious freedom as follows: A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct. A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and I say this without any reliance upon s. 15 of the Charter. Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person. The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.44Dickson's language of extending religious freedom only to the point that "such manifestations do not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of their own"45 relies heavily on Mill's harm principle. He continues along Mill's path in writing that freedom of religion is limited to protect "public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."46 In the Court's analysis, such freedom to manifest one's beliefs free from coercion or constraint is grounded in the inherent dignity and rights of the human person. This concept of "dignity" and the way in which it comes to be interpreted and applied has proven to be a critical question in the evolution of freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada, most notably in balancing s. 2(a) religious freedoms against s. 15 equality rights of same-sex couples. Two other important precedents that flow from Big M Drug Mart should also be noted. First, Chief Justice Dickson refused to limit s. 2(a) to the content of the freedom as it stood in 1982 or in the Canadian Bill of Rights. In doing so, he opened the door to broad judicial discretion as to the content of s. 2(a) that could evolve over time. Any limitations on the scope of s. 2(a) would have to take place under the s. 1 override clause. Second, the formal equality rule that overlooks personal differences in applying equal treatment was rejected in favour of substantive or "true" equality as it relates to religious freedom. Chief Justice Dickson ruled that "[t]he equality necessary to support religious freedom does not require identical treatment of all religions. In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in treatment."47 Thus, each individual case will be concerned with the impact of the law on different religious groups, which may require differential treatment and a highly contextual analysis. One year later, Chief Justice Dickson considered a similar question in Edwards Books,48 a case which challenged the constitutionality of a Sunday-closing law in Ontario. Four Ontario retailers were charged with failing to ensure that no goods were sold on a Sunday contrary to the Retail Business Holidays Act.49 An exemption existed under s. 3(4) of the Act which allowed stores to open on Sunday if they had been closed on Saturday, with no more than seven employees working and less than 5,000 square feet of retail space to serve the public. Writing for the majority, Dickson C.J. upheld the Act and its partial exemption as a reasonable limit on freedom of religion under s. 1. In distinguishing Big M Drug Mart, Dickson characterized the purpose of the Act as being non-religious, invoking the need for a common day of rest for purely secular reasons. Edwards Books shows greater deference to legislatures in emphasizing the reasonableness of the state's objective (giving people a day of rest) over the infringement itself. After having rejected the distinction between belief and action in Big M Drug Mart, Dickson also rejected the previously-held distinction between direct and indirect burdens on freedom of religion: "all coercive burdens on religious practice, be they direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseeable, are potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a)."50 By constitutionally prohibiting indirect burdens that effectively degrade the ability to practice one's religion, Edwards Books affirmed Big M Drug Mart's broad interpretation of freedom of religion, subject only to the infliction of harm, or the infringement on the rights of others. Another important chapter in the freedom of religion story is the recent case of Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem.51 Although it did not deal with same-sex equality claims, the comprehensive legal test and broad interpretation of religious freedom will undoubtedly influence the balancing exercise when such rights collide in the future. The appellants, Orthodox Jews who co-owned units in luxury buildings in Montreal, set up succahs on their balconies to fulfill the biblically mandated obligation to dwell in temporary huts during the annual 9-day Jewish festival of Succot. They challenged the by-laws in the declaration of co-ownership which prohibited decorations, alterations and constructions on the balconies. In a 5-4 decision, the majority held that the burdens placed upon the appellants constituted a non-trivial interference and thus an infringement of their s. 2(a) rights to dwell in a succah during the festival of Succot. It also broadly defined religion itself as follows: In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual's spiritual faith and integrally linked to his or her self-definition and spiritual fulfillment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.52After Amselem, the "value" of a religious belief in the eyes of the Court no longer mattered. What mattered was simply whether the belief was deeply held and integral to the claimant's self-definition. This comprehensive definition, which affirmed religion as integral to identity, was a welcome change from the confused and narrow interpretation in Chamberlain. The majority then established the scope and content of freedom of religion under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as follows: freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials.53Thus, Amselem stands for the important precedent that a "religious belief" need not be reasonable, objectively held or sanctioned by official dogma, but rather a "sincerely held belief with a nexus with religion." Once non-trivial interference in a religious belief is established, religious conduct can only be limited if it would potentially cause harm or interference with the rights of others with a view to the underlying context in which the conflict arises. This legal framework broadening the scope of freedom of religion was affirmed in Multani. In a 5-3 decision (Major J. took no part in the judgement), the majority quashed a decision by a public school's council of commissioners to prohibit Multani from carrying a concealed kirpan (Sikh ceremonial dagger) to school. Since the religious belief was sincerely held and the burden was non-trivial, Multani's freedom of religion was infringed. The Court held that this prohibition could not be saved by s. 1 since it was not minimally impairing. After the broad interpretation of reasonable accommodation for the particularities of sincerely held religious beliefs in Amselem and Multani, the SCC appears to be moving in the direction of a more accommodating modus vivendi. By seeking to accommodate the greatest number of viewpoints in the public square, we move away from the "winner take all" litigation approach towards genuine diversity and tolerance.The Same Sex Story: Balancing Religion and Equality Under the Charter The debate over same-sex rights under the Charter has transcended law into the realm of culture, religion, identity and politics. The conflict between same-sex equality and freedom of religion has become the focal point for the competing faces of liberalism, evident in a number of recent cases dealing with civil marriage, freedom of contract and both public and private education. One of the first major cases to balance religious freedom, same-sex equality rights and the civic values articulated by Chief Justice Dickson in Big M Drug Mart was Trinity Western.54 At issue in this case was the refusal of the British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) to approve the teacher training program of Trinity Western University (TWU), a private university associated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada. The BCCT denied the application on the grounds that the student Code of Conduct contained discriminatory practices by having students agree to abstain from "biblically condemned" practices which encompassed "sexual sins. . .including homosexual behaviour."55 A majority of the SCC overturned the decision of the BCCT for lack of evidence that graduates of the TWU program would be unfit to teach in the public school system. As a result, the Court distinguished the protected belief of TWU from the unprotected conduct of graduates in the public school system. Trinity Western implicitly affirmed Mill's harm principle as the most appropriate mechanism to balance competing rights claims. The case was decided in TWU's favour on the absence of evidence that students in the public education system had their rights infringed upon by TWU graduates. Iacobucci J. and Bastarache J. writing for the majority, define the scope of religious freedom as follows: Students attending TWU are free to adopt personal rules of conduct based on their religious beliefs provided they do not interfere with the rights of others. Their freedom of religion is not accommodated if the consequence of its exercise is the denial of the right of full participation in society.56In the absence of evidence of tangible harm through the conduct of TWU graduates, the imposition of a symbolic affirmation of homosexuality in a private, religious school would lead us squarely down the path of rational consensus liberalism. TWU does not need to agree with or publicly affirm homosexual conduct to give effect to s. 15 rights. The impetus for including s. 15 in the Charter was not to use the law to forge a societal consensus on the "good life." The premise of this paper is that the judiciary's duty to intervene is triggered when tangible harm has been caused. If TWU graduates teaching in the public education system were found to be treating homosexual students differently, or substituting their own religious views on homosexuality in place of the curriculum, then a good case could be made for limiting s. 2(a) for infringing on the rights of individual students. However, to proactively restrict Charter rights to protect students from an abstract, nebulous notion of potential harm would fail to provide the kind of accommodation of difference and disagreement that lies at the heart of pluralism. Moving from the private to the public education context, the Chamberlain decision further complicated this conflict of rights with the sensitive issue of the role of parents and teachers in early childhood education. Under the School Act57 of British Columbia, the Minister of Education confers on school boards the authority to approve supplementary education resource material, subject to Ministerial discretion. At issue was the Surrey School Board's decision not to approve three books depicting same-sex parented families for the family life educational curriculum of Kindergarten—Grade One (K-1) children.58 The Board cited the cognitive dissonance and age-appropriateness of such controversial material in light of some parents' objection to the morality of same-sex relationships. The crux of the case rested upon the interpretation of "strictly secular" and "non-sectarian" requirements of the School Act. McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority, quashed the Board's resolution for acting outside of its mandate under the School Act. According to the majority, the Board violated the principles of secularism and tolerance in s.76 of the Act, departed from its own regulation by failing to consider the relevance of the proposed material and needs of children of same-sex parented families, and applied the wrong criteria by failing to consider the goal that all children be made aware of the diversity of family models in society. McLachlin C.J. measured religious freedoms against the Charter values of dignity and tolerance and found that Charter values prevailed. Importantly, all nine judges of the SCC affirmed the unanimous B.C. Court of Appeal's interpretation of "secular" as being religiously inclusive, rejecting the B.C. Supreme Court's characterization of "secular" as "non-religious" or "not influenced even in part by religion." This important shift away from an a-religious secularism would later be affirmed in the SCC decisions of Amselem and Multani. In a lengthy, strongly worded dissent, Gonthier J. (writing for himself and Bastarache J.) would have deferred to the expertise of the School Board and upheld the resolution on administrative law principles. The lack of a privative clause, the local expertise in balancing interests of different groups, the purpose of the Board's authority to allow for local input, and the highly contextual and polycentric nature of the analysis all weighed in favour of deference to the School Board. Gonthier emphasized the paramount role of parents in the education of children and the state's secondary role (especially with the K-1 age group), respecting the decisions of local school boards who can take into account contextual factors and the needs of parents.59 He joined the majority in criticizing the religiously exclusive interpretation of "secular" espoused by Saunders J. of the B.C. Supreme Court in which one's moral view should not be heard in the public square if it manifests from a religiously grounded faith. The reasoning in the dissent echoes the modus vivendi liberalism articulated by John Gray in seeking peaceful coexistence, as opposed to a rational consensus, on the issue of homosexuality. It is fine if a consensus develops organically as is arguably occurring with the death penalty in Canada. But if we are to be honest with Canada's pluralism of faiths and identities, as well as the very impetus for the liberal state, than it is not the role of the judiciary or the state to impose this societal consensus on a divided public. This is perfectly articulated in Gonthier's dissent: Nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based moral positions trump religiously based moral positions on matters of public policy. . .The key is that people will disagree about important issues, and such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern pluralism.60The true measure of tolerance in a liberal state is found not in our ability to reach a societal consensus along the lines of Charter values, but in our ability to live together peaceably in disagreement. This modus vivendi was the impetus for the liberal state, and must be reclaimed by liberal theorists, political leaders and judges if it is to hold promise and meaning for increasingly diverse societies in an age of globalization. From the realm of education to the private sphere, same-sex equality litigation has also had a significant effect upon freedom of contract under provincial human rights legislation. In Brockie,61 a lower-level but oft-cited case from the Ontario Divisional Court, the appellant Scott Brockie challenged an order of the Board of Inquiry of the Ontario Human Rights Commission requiring him to provide printing services to the Gay and Lesbian Archives (GALA) and other organizations existing for the benefit of gays and lesbians. Brockie held the religious belief that homosexual conduct was sinful and while he did serve homosexual individuals, he argued that s. 2(a) of the Charter protected his religious freedom to refuse service to a gay advocacy organization. The Court found the original order to serve GALA and all related organizations to be overly intrusive in achieving its objectives, but still ordered Brockie to pay the $5,000 in damages and provide printing services to gay and lesbian organizations unless the specific material came into direct conflict with the core elements of his religious beliefs. Notably, the Court rejected Brockie's distinction between discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on the political act of promoting the causes of those who have such characteristics.62 As Peter Pound and Iain T. Benson have noted, when it comes to human dignity, the distinction between a person and a cause (or political organization) is important.63 If Brockie had happily served homosexual clients, how does his refusal to support a political organization and lobby group on religious grounds infringe upon the rights of GALA? If GALA faced undue hardship in its reasonable accommodation of Brockie's religious beliefs (to use the language of human rights legislation), they might well satisfy the harm principle and thus limit Brockie's freedom of religion. If, on the other hand, any other printer in Toronto could provide the same services, it would be difficult to prove tangible harm and compel Brockie to act against his religious beliefs. In fact, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association intervened in Brockie at the Divisional Court level and argued that there was no valid ground to impose a supposed "state policy" of advancing the "visibility" of gays and lesbians over the beliefs of a citizen such as Brockie to express his own beliefs in the public square. In 2003, EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)64 was the first of a series of cases across the country that expanded the common law definition of marriage to include same-sex couples. At the time, only Holland, Belgium and Spain had legalized same-sex marriage. In a rapid and radical transformation, the EGALE decision was followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada (A.G.)65 and the Quebec Court of Appeal in Hendricks c. Quebec (P.G.)66. By 2005, same-sex marriage was legal in all other provinces and territories except for Alberta, P.E.I., Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. In a controversial policy move, the federal government did not appeal any of the decisions, and instead referred draft legislation to the SCC following the Reference Re Same Sex Marriage.67 This led to the enactment of the Civil Marriage Act68 in July 2005, which extended the right of civil marriage to same-sex couples across the country. In the landmark Halpern decision, the Court held that the common law rule in Hyde v. Hyde69 which prescribed marriage as a union between a man and a woman violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by denying homosexual couples access to the regulatory regimes that govern and constitute marriage at law. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the human dignity of same sex couples had been violated by the discriminatory effect of the formal distinction based on sexual orientation and this could not be saved under s. 1. Accordingly, the existing definition was declared invalid and was reformulated as "the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others."70 The same-sex trilogy of cases and the piece meal evolution of the common law that followed forced the federal government's hand in enacting the Civil Marriage Act on a fiercely divided public in the name of Charter rights.Part III : In Good Faith to Whom? Reconciling Competing Sources of Authority As the case law has shown, the Canadian state is now conceived, in popular and constitutional discourses, as officially "secular" yet supportive of religious pluralism and multiculturalism.71 Religious freedom has been given a wide interpretation, subject only to potential interference in the rights of others. In contrast to the US position at law of an impregnable wall between church and state, the Canadian position is more nuanced. While there is an underlying separation of church and state, Canada's approach to multiculturalism has been translated into a fostering of religious expression and conduct, provided that it is done in a neutral, evenhanded manner. We have only to look at our comparative constitutional elements to explain this difference. According to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (1791), "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof".72 This non-establishment clause stands in marked contrast to the Charter Preamble, which recognizes both the supremacy of God and the rule of law. The reconciliation of sacred and secular sources of authority, coupled with Canada's commitment to nurture communities of faith in an even-handed manner, is no simple task for Canada's increasingly pluralistic society of diverse faiths, cultures and identities. Early Charter cases established an expansive definition to religious freedom in an attempt to foster religious practice in an even-handed manner, yet religious values are ultimately evaluated against the values of the rational, non-religious actor, articulated in Canada as the constitutional rule of law. When such worldviews collide in a conflict of rights, religious 'choice' will be only be accepted in belief not action (Trinity Western), private not public (Big M Drug Mart), or if in public, only in accordance with Charter values (Chamberlain). This is a problem that Chief Justice McLachlin, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Iain T. Benson, Bruce MacDougall and Benjamin Berger have all attempted to resolve by finding the proper balance between religious freedom and the 'secular' rule of law.Religion and the Rule of Law: A Dialectic of Citizens or Normative Commitments? Chief Justice McLachlin's article entitled "Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective"73 offers us a rare glimpse into the reasoning underlying decisions of the SCC. Far from a cloistered, modest perspective, McLachlin C.J. makes the bold assertion, borrowed from Yale professor Paul Kahn, that the rule of law "makes total claims upon the self and leaves little of human experience untouched."74 As religion exerts a similarly comprehensive claim, the law must assert its own ultimate authority while carving out a space for individuals and communities to manifest alternative, often competing, sets of ultimate commitments. This view demonstrates a "dialectic of normative commitments" which McLachlin C.J. explains as follows: What is good, true, and just in religion will not always comport with the law's view of the matter, nor will society at large always properly respect conscientious adherence to alternate authorities and divergent normative, or ethical, commitments. Where this is so, two comprehensive worldviews collide. . .It is the courts that are most often faced with this clash and charged with managing this dialectic.75This language of "total claims upon self" echoes what was once the exclusive realm of metaphysical claims of complete submission to this ultimate authority. As Iain T. Benson has noted, this worldview positions law as "capable of determining not only what is just but what is 'good' and 'true'."76 The definition and imposition of the "common good" as a sort of objective truth is precisely what liberalism was reacting against. Individual autonomy, not societal consensus as dictated by the state or judiciary, is liberalism's true vehicle for self-fulfillment and the determination of what is "good" and "true." The irony is that the very same liberal values are used by the Chief Justice as a justification of the absolute comprehensiveness of the rule of law. In her response to Chief Justice McLachlin, political philosopher and ethicist Jean Bethke Elshtain questions this characterization of religion and the rule of law as a dialectic of normative commitments. Instead of assuming that law is a comprehensive worldview capable of managing this dialectic, Elshtain views the adversarial legal system as a last resort. Her alternative to McLachlin's "clash of commitments" can be summarized as follows: I believe that the 'dialectic of normative commitments'. . .is (or should be) primarily a dialectic of citizens, variously located, through a culture of democratic argument: citizens engaging one another and sorting things out, as often they will, in a rather untidy, rough and ready way.77Elshtain's view of the goods at stake are not totalistic religious or legal goods, but more complete understandings of a public good, variously derived. Instead of reducing differences of opinions to the rights trump card in the adversarial courtroom, the Courts should take a more modest approach and allow the pluralism of the public sphere to flourish free from pre-emptive adjudication. Only when that pluralism inflicts tangible harm on other groups and individuals should the courts intervene. This "dialectic of citizens" would necessarily take place in the realm of civil society, which I will analyze in greater detail in Part IV. Elshtain also correctly notes that "religious faith is not a private matter: it is constitutive of a form of public membership in a church, temple, synagogue, or mosque."78 Religious adherents79 cannot leave their faith at the gate when they enter the public square. Elshtain's views of the totality of religion are echoed by Benjamin Berger: When religious conscience is properly understood as a pervasive claim upon the lives of believers, a liberalism that demands the severance of moral claims and political positions and a vision of secularism that requires an a-religious public space are irreconcilable with the freedom of religion accorded by the Charter.80To the devout adherent, religious belief infuses all aspects of being. It flows from a divine authority and at the same time "asserts the complete pervasiveness of this transcendent principle."81 Liberalism's fundamental flaw is that while it tolerates different worldviews, it ultimately asserts its superiority over them. It fails to recognize that adherence to a faith community, whether it be religious or non-religious, is more than an individual choice in the rational liberal exercise; it is another valid way of experiencing reality. It is deeply tempting for all of us who view the world through a liberal lens to see religion, like every other decision in life, as a matter of individual choice. However, this approach is blind to the deeper issues at play. When we measure an irrational, divine source of authority against objective reason in the form of the rule of law, the decision is an easy one. This flawed assumption means that the terms of the debate are already decided before religious groups even get to court. However, by failing to understand the values underlying the constitutional rule of law and liberalism itself, we fail to see law and religion for what Berger has described as a "cross-cultural encounter."82Understanding the "Secular" Central to the debate at hand is the way in which basic terms like "secular" are defined and understood. Iain T. Benson has written extensively on the use (and misuse) of "secular" and "secularism" which are frequently cited in defining the contours of law and politics in Canada.83 According to Benson, the "secular" has come to incorrectly signify a realm that is neutral or "religion-free," something which poses a challenge to all religions. He critiques the Chamberlain decision's confused understanding of a-religious "secularism" and the religiously inclusive "secular": Its confusion about secularism led to practical results that did not so much uphold diversity as undermine it. Contrary to the court's own principles, the Chamberlain decision produced a rank-ordering of rights in which the sexual dogma of same-sex advocates effectively trumped all challengers, including those of parents with religious convictions about their children's education.By delving into the historical uses of the term "secular," Benson explains that the Roman Catholic distinction between "secular" and "religious" is purely jurisdictional in the sense that "secular clergy" served in the world (ie. parishes) and "regular clergy" were those who lived according to a "rule" (ie. those who took vows of poverty and obedience) and served outside of the parish.84 From these religious origins, the concept of secularism has become a belief system or faith unto itself. Its purported neutrality and objectivity is dangerously misleading, as it has been elevated to a new form of sectarianism which places explicit belief systems at a marked disadvantage in politics, public education and law itself. Benson advocates for a religiously inclusive view of the state which is not run or directed by a particular religion, but aims to develop a notion of moral citizenship with the widest involvement of religious and non-religious faith groups: A proper understanding of the secular, however, will seek to understand what faith claims are necessary for the public sphere, and a properly constituted secular government (non-sectarian not non-faith) will see as necessary the due accommodation of religiously informed beliefs from a variety of cultures.85By correctly understanding the "secular" as non-sectarian as opposed to non-faith, the terms of the debate, whether they be in the courtroom, classroom or public square, are enlarged to not simply tolerate, but to better understand, and seek guidance from, Canada's diverse faiths. However, if religious expression goes completely unchecked by the judiciary in the name of pluralism, there is a danger of tacitly encouraging and accepting religious extremism, preaching hatred and the infliction of tangible harm on others in the name of a superior metaphysical claim to truth. If Benson's perspective is one of largely unmitigated pluralism that hopes for a much more modest, deferential SCC in regards to religious groups and civil associations, then Bruce Mac- Dougall presents the opposite view. MacDougall compares the distinctions of heterosexual and homosexual rights made by the SCC in Trinity Western and the B.C. Court of Appeal in Chamberlain (which was overturned in certain aspects on appeal at the SCC) and the refusal of marriage commissioners to officiate at same-sex civil marriages to similar, yet unacceptable distinctions based on race or gender. On the marriage commissioner issue, he argues that it is constitutionally inappropriate to accommodate religious freedom in that it would deny equality of access for same-sex couple through the use of a "religious veto."86 In any other competing rights claim in the public sphere, MacDougall argues that freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should prevail over religious sensibilities, though he is quick to say that this does not set up a hierarchy of Charter protections. In marked contrast to Benson, MacDougall posits that "in order for true equality to exist, the members of a group must not be shown just compassion and condonement, but must be celebrated by the state"87 (emphasis added). In sum, the full realization of dignity based on s. 15 rights not only requires equal treatment, but the public affirmation of homosexuality by the Canadian state and judiciary. The values of "tolerance" and "equality" would therefore become the vehicles for imposing a societal consensus on a divided public in the name of Charter values. The flaw in MacDougall's analysis is in the belief that greater social cohesion and understanding will flow from imposing this consensus in the name of dignity and the public affirmation of homosexuality. By relegating the dissenters to the private sphere, MacDougall fails to tackle the problem head on (ie. through dialogue, civil society and Elshtain's "dialectic of citizens") and compounds the lack of understanding and fragmentation of Canadian society. Lastly, MacDougall takes issue with the religious characterization of homosexuality as an issue of morality, arguing that such moralities of aspiration are not well suited to legal adjudication in a secular world. I would argue that different individual moralities of aspiration are exactly what are needed to reflect and affirm genuine tolerance and a plurality of worldviews in the public sphere.88 Somewhere in between Benson's religiously inclusive conception of the state and MacDougall's public affirmation of Charter values is Benjamin Berger's view of increased cultural pluralism in the public sphere, subject only to the "civic values" of security, dignity and autonomy. Berger writes that conventional approaches to liberalism and secularism have intensified the challenge of reconciling freedom of religion in a secular polity by providing a misguided vision of an a-religious and hyper-rational public space devoid of moral commitments.89 He goes on to describe the constitutional rule of law and religious freedom as a distinctly "cross-cultural encounter". Berger criticizes the fact the rule of law has been positioned as the arbiter of competing worldviews when rights collide, instead of a participant in a pluralistic public sphere. Accordingly, his solution to the doctrinal requirements of religion and law is "the invocation of a core set of civic values—the values that will guide liberalism and mediate pluralism."90 While this language of civic values appears to strike a balance between religious freedom and the security, autonomy and dignity of the individual, the interpretation of these broad, illdefined "values" has the potential to lead us back down the path of convergence. By elevating certain rights as Charter or civic "values," it imposes a "one size fits all" remedy when rights collide. The judicial treatment of dignity illustrates this vague and potentially overbroad application.91 If dignity were interpreted to mean public affirmation of homosexuality (as MacDougall has argued), then failure to affirm such dignity in the public sphere would leave little room for disagreement. In an indirect way, Berger's language of "civic values" could be used to impose a societal consensus and strip the public sphere from the cultural and religious pluralism he espouses. According to Benson: If citizens (religious and non), continue to attempt to speak to surrounding cultures in confused language (such as by misusing the term "secular" or using the pseudo-moral language of "values" when they mean an objective category of truth and meaning), they will never succeed in communicating those matters that are deepest and most essential to citizenship and culture."92Only by identifying and challenging some of the normative assumptions of underpinning the law, can we create a public sphere that accommodates a diversity of faiths, identities and cultures. However, the point of this paper is that pluralism should be mediated by the harm principle, not by civic values that can unwittingly bind liberalism to a rational consensus.Part IV: Liberalism Unbound: Towa rds a More Inclusive Public Sphere Liberalism needs to be reclaimed. Imposing a societal consensus as to the common good based on ill-defined "Charter values" flies in the face of liberalism's raison d'être and the modus vivendi principles that should guide a pluralistic society. Borrowing heavily from Kant, Hannah Arendt offers guidance with her theory of judgement based on an "enlarged mentality."93 It maintains that judgement is distinct from provable truth claims because it involves the act of reflecting on a matter from the perspective of others. Since judgement is seen as inherently subjective, it cannot compel others in the same way as an objective truth. We see these same ideas reverberating in Charles Taylor's discussion of the normative "good" and John Gray's principles of modus vivendi. Far from being universal, liberalism's exclusive focus on the individual is a relatively recent phenomenon that is grounded in the unique circumstances of the West. The ultimate supremacy of the individual and "secular reason" is deeply problematic for Aboriginals, ethnic groups in an increasingly multicultural landscape, and the millions of Canadians who cannot simply relegate their faith to the private sphere. But even the most pluralistic, accommodating liberalism is not a panacea. Since the courts and the state reason from a liberal paradigm with its faith in rationalism, skepticism, individualism and objectivity, liberalism is not seen as an ideology or cultural system in itself, but rather the impartial arbiter of ideological or cultural encounters in the public sphere. When rights collide, religion must ultimately "listen to reason."94 Applying Charter values should not mean relegating "dissenters" to their own private realms. Human dignity and religious accommodation are not mutually exclusive. The impact of litigating these polarizing positions in a "winner take all" courtroom is felt by more than just some irate fundamentalists. By stripping away religion from the public sphere, diversity is subtly transformed into fragmentation. When ethnic and religious groups are alienated in an a-religious and a-cultural public sphere (ironically, in the name of greater integration), such groups withdraw into their own ghettoized communities. If there is no space in the public sphere for moderate religion, it will retreat into greater extremism, stereotyping and lack of understanding. To take a recent example from Quebec, if Muslim girls are not allowed to play soccer while wearing the hijab for so-called safety reasons, they will simply stop (or be forced to stop) playing the game entirely.95 If elements of sharia law are not allowed to co-exist in family law arbitrations and tribunals, such disputes will disappear into the dark corridors of the private sphere, far from the scrutiny, accountability and civic value of the public sphere.96 If children of deeply religious families are faced with a public school system that does not accommodate certain views on early childhood education, the proliferation of home schooling and private, religious education could be close behind. This would have disastrous consequences for the public school system, not just financially, but in terms of the fundamental civic lessons of understanding, compromise, debate and respect for difference. To avoid this problem with the vague language of civic values, I have argued for a more accommodating form of liberalism limited only by Mill's harm principle. This principle was affirmed by Dickson, C.J. in Big M Drug Mart and Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 1597 where the Court stated that an individual's freedom to express one's religious beliefs "is restricted by the right of others to hold and to manifest beliefs and opinions of their own, and to be free from injury from the exercise of the freedom of religion of others."98 Without elevating certain vague 'civic values' above all others (be they religious or not), it allows for a more clearly defined and modest balancing of competing rights in the public sphere. Viewing the same-sex marriage debate through the harm principle would go a long ways to pre-empt the valid criticisms of the courts imposing a rational consensus in the name of Charter values. It would be much more difficult to demonstrate the tangible harm inflicted on heterosexual couples by extending civil marriage to same-sex couples, especially considering the exemption in the Civil Marriage Act for religious marriage, which allows officials of religious groups to refuse to perform same-sex marriages. In The Collapse of the Harm Principle,99 Bernard Harcourt deconstructs the normative dimensions of the harm principle to show how it has been widely used in the United States for the de facto enforcement of morality. He illustrates how the harm principle has justified the regulation of pornography, prostitution, disorderly conduct, homosexuality, intoxication, drug use and fornication in support of a conserv

The scene on Indianapolis’s east side seemed almost symbolic. On one side of the street was Shepherd Community Ministries, a center that served vulnerable and disadvantaged families. On the other side was a narrow alley where crack deals were made on a regular basis. It was as though the forces of good and evil were facing off across Washington Street. Shepherd’s director, Pastor Jay Height, was tired of worrying that the children he worked with every day might wind up on the wrong side of the street. So he came up with an idea: turn the crack alley into a park, a well-lit green area that drug dealers would shun. There was only one problem. To have the alley vacated, he would have to work with more than fifty separate contacts—agencies within city government, neighborhood organizations, utilities, assessors, and others. Most people would have thrown up their hands and walked away. Instead, Pastor Height contacted the Front Porch Alliance (FPA), a city agency that works with value-shaping organizations, particularly faith-based organizations.Because the FPA employees understood how city procedures worked, they could help Pastor Height vacate the alley. “Granted, it is not always as successful as you would like, but in this case, we were able to make it work through teamwork,” said Pastor Height, “And the neat thing to me is to be able to look at it and say, “Here is something beautiful.” Once the FPA cleared away government obstacles, many concerned organizations sprang forward to help make the neighborhood safer. Keep Indianapolis Beautiful, a private nonprofit group, designed the new park and supervised its construction. The two businesses that adjoined the old alley agreed to become the park’s nominal owners. Volunteers from Youth for Christ put down soil and planted flowers. This raises some important questions about why and how much government should get involved in troubled neighborhoods. Suppose you told Pastor Height’s story to two political theorists, one traditionally conservative, the other traditionally liberal. The conservative would nod knowingly and explain that once cumbersome government regulations were out of the way, the neighborhood improved on its own. “Not at all,” the liberal would retort. “The alley couldn’t have been vacated if government hadn’t become actively involved.” The director of the FPA, Isaac Randolph, puts it another way. “Everyone agrees that government has a core responsibility,” he says. “But the core has a circumference, and the controversy is over the size of the circumference. Conservatives use a microscope to measure it; liberals use a yardstick.” In Indianapolis, we have realized that neither approach is right. The traditional liberal belief in massive governmental intervention is misguided, but so is the idea that government should abandon neighborhoods altogether. There is a role for government to play in neighborhood revitalization. But what is it, if it is not the oversized federal programs that plague our cities today? Indianapolis’s experience of outsourcing municipal services may provide a useful comparison. Although we have attracted national attention for privatizing services, it wasn’t simply privatization that allowed us to save over $420 million. Rather, it was competition between government agencies and private companies: whoever offered to do the best job at the lowest cost won the contract. In other words, it didn’t matter whether municipal services were performed by the government or by the private sector; what mattered was that government outsourced those services fairly, supervised them closely, and made sure they were being provided well. The same principle, with a few modifications, can be applied to neighborhood revitalization. City government is certainly responsible for urban neighborhoods, just as it is responsible for trash collection, for example. But just because government is responsible for making sure a service is provided doesn’t mean that government has to provide that service itself. Just as government can work with private companies to collect trash, it can work with nonprofit organizations to improve neighborhoods. One job that government can do is simply helping neighborhood organizations understand rules and regulations—especially those for which government itself is responsible. The FPA’s part in vacating the crack alley is a good example. Or consider Lakeview Christian Center, a suburban congregation on the west side of Indianapolis. Lakeview had been planning to build another church in the inner city for years, but it was worried about the complicated process of land acquisition. The FPA helped it through the process. But then the FPA did something else—something even more important. It noticed that one of the city’s worst-performing public schools was located near the site of the new church. So the FPA proposed a partnership between Lakeview and the school. Now Lakeview sends tutors to help struggling students, provides food to needy families identified by the school’s social worker, and helps run an after-school program for advanced students. The FPA had become what Michael Joyce calls a “civic switchboard,” a central body that connects various groups for the public good. Those two functions—helping neighborhood organizations wade through government rules and acting as a civic switchboard—are comparatively uncontroversial, even when the organizations in question are faith based. The real controversy arises when government begins funding services provided by faith-based organizations. While this controversy isn’t surprising, the history of the FPA may show why it is misplaced. The FPA was founded in 1997, two years into my second term. We had already invested a record $1.35 billion in the city’s infrastructure to rebuild the physical structure of neglected inner-city neighborhoods. Then we had turned our attention to an even bigger challenge, strengthening those neighborhoods organizationally. We did that by helping the neighborhoods form umbrella organizations, paying for a full-time neighborhood coordinator for each umbrella, and funding all of them with Community Development Block Grant dollars. That program was a limited success. We discovered that even though we had budged a little from the traditionally conservative hands-off approach, neighborhoods couldn’t provide all the services they needed by themselves. So in 1997 we formed the Front Porch Alliance. We spent months canvassing the city, explaining to community leaders that we wanted to start working with them, supporting them, and even funding them. Once we had a strong base of support in the community, we went public. The point is that the FPA wasn’t intended to include only faith-based organizations. All sorts of value-shaping nonprofits were approached and invited to join us. Some of the organizations had existing specific relationships with city hall, for example, community development corporations worked with (or sometimes against) the Development Department. But as time went on, we discovered that most frequently the new and smaller organizations that chose to become most actively involved in the FPA were faith based. That wasn’t because we were discriminating in favor of faith-based groups. When the Robinson Community African Methodist Episcopal Church decided to open a community center for summer camps, after-school programs, tutoring, and so forth, we leased an abandoned fire station to it cheaply. When the Indianapolis Black Firefighters Association decided to convert another abandoned fire station into a community center, we supported it as well. Our job was to help value-shaping organizations improve their neighborhoods, whether those organizations were faith based or not. Nevertheless, the most frequent and enduring partners surrounded their physical assistance with faith. Not only should government be sure never to discriminate in favor of religion, it should never force anyone to participate in a religious program. For example, the FPA has initiated a program called Community Involvement, in which youths in the juvenile justice system are referred to faith-based organizations in their neighborhoods. However, the court provides various secular programs as well, which are just as accessible as Community Involvement. No one is assigned to a pastor without choosing that option. Now let’s examine a more difficult question. It makes sense not to discriminate against faithbased organizations when contracting for social services. For instance, when Safe Haven, a foundation that helps victims of domestic violence, needed to find a way to transport children to its programs, we didn’t hesitate to set up a partnership with several churches, which were paid to transport the children. But what about hiring faith-based organizations to provide social services that include religious elements? Should government have any part in that? Many people would say no emphatically—and I think this is a subject about which reasonable people can disagree. However, my view is that so long as government doesn’t fund religion directly, it should be able to support social services to which faith-based organizations may add a religious component. That is, if a church runs a homeless shelter with beds paid for by government, it shouldn’t be prevented from asking its guests to pray once a day. Again, government should always be sure to support secular shelters as well, so that no one is compelled to enter one with a religious component. One way to steer clear of some of these issues is to work with nonprofit bodies set up by faith-based organizations. If a church sets up a homeless shelter next door, and if the shelter is an independent 501(c)(3), it is much easier to preserve separation between the church’s religious function and the shelter’s social service. Programs like the FPA would be in good shape if the only opposition they faced was from people concerned with the separation of church and state. But we learned the hard way that there was a bigger obstacle: the churches didn’t trust us. Faith-based organizations in Indianapolis had long grown accustomed to a negative relationship with government: they were ignored at best and mistreated at worst. When we approached pastors and proposed an alliance, they were highly skeptical. “What’s in it for the government?” they kept wondering. “What political hoops do we have to jump through?” In the end, we secured their support in three ways. First, we established an advisory board and spent time consulting with the organizations and getting their advice before publicly announcing the FPA. This showed them that we wouldn’t spring any surprises on them and that we were serious about incorporating their suggestions into our plans. Second, we assisted them immediately and strongly, instead of just talking about it. And third, we invested heavily in the FPA. We tripled its work force from three people to nine—and that’s unusual in an administration that has cut the payroll by a quarter. We wanted every pastor who worked with an FPA representative to know that he or she was working with someone who had the mayor’s ear. Once we won over the churches, we faced an even bigger problem— that government employees returned their distrust. Just because my administration formed the FPA didn’t mean that every city employee supported the idea. Public employees lacked confidence in the capacity of faith-based organizations. Grant monitors in particular paid closer attention to procedural details—with which the organizations were understandably unfamiliar—than to programs’ outcomes. This is still a problem, but the FPA has improved relations by translating between government bureaucracy and informal, good-hearted but not paper-work-minded faith organizations. Faith-based organizations are a badly underused resource for improving the lives of disadvantaged Americans. As government begins working with them, it will come to realize what we in Indianapolis discovered two years ago: that faith-based organizations are infinitely more capable of handling neighborhood problems than government is. Unlike government officials, faith-based organizations tend to be tied closely to neighborhoods. By working with government officials, faith-based organizations can be part of solid solutions. When I looked out of my window on the twenty-fifth floor of the City-County Building, I saw the whole city, but not any individual neighborhood very well. When a pastor looks out of his window, he sees the people who need help and the houses that need rehabilitation. Sometimes, if he is motivated enough, he even sees the crack alley that needs to be vacated and cleaned up. But there is another reason that faith-based and value-shaping organizations are such a vital part of our communities. No matter how hard local governments work to keep taxes low, improve municipal services, repair the infrastructure, and so on, true urban strength can only be built on values. Without a population that cares about maintaining a civil society, a city will crumble. Values are best transmitted in two ways, through families and through local value-shaping organizations, particularly faith-based organizations. If government begins to partner with those organizations, they will not only provide services better than government can, they will teach our youth about citizenship, civility, charity, and a host of other values more effectively than ever before. This is an idea whose time has come. More public servants are beginning to explore the world of possibilities that government-faith partnerships offer. If we succeed—if we encourage organizations like the FPA in cities all over the country, if we promote similar initiatives on a national scale—we will be harnessing the nation’s greatest energy to deal with the nation’s greatest problems.   Originally published in What’s God Got to do with the American Experiment?, E.J. Dionne Jr. and John J. DiIulio, Eds., p: 72-80. Permission granted by Brookings Institution Press.

I had the privilege on a Sunday evening in the spring of 2006 to be part of a conversation with a group of twentysomethings at First Christian Reformed Church in Hamilton, Ontario, my home city. The group calls itself Common Ground, and it quickly and easily catapulted high into my list of Favourite Groups. The walk to the church was one of my best half hours of the year: fresh air at just the right temperature, liquid gold late afternoon sunlight, the fine fabric of the city streets, the shabbychic architecture and landscaping of our neighbourhood, the laughter of children playing street games and of families and friends gathered for food and conversation, the singing of birds, and the anticipation of good work to do. Part of our conversation was in response to this question: What one thing can you change in your current habits that would make a tiny but significant and enduring positive difference to the people who live in the same apartment building or on the same street as you do? Common Ground members listed all kinds of ideas, some of which they subsequently listed on their website (http://commonground.firsthamilton.ca/wiki/index.php/Responsibility): start a book club (first book: The Birth House by Ami MacKay) with people in my community; pick up litter in and around our apartment building; offer to help babysit for the teenage mom that lives a few apartments down; send in hundreds of tree request forms to the city for free road allowance trees to be planted, even if owners are unaware of the opportunity; learn the names of my neighbours that I meet in the elevator; finally have that barbeque with our neighbours. First Christian Reformed Church in Hamilton is not my home church, but it is within walking distance of my home in the old city neighbourhood of Kirkendall. Walking to the Common Ground meeting reminded me of a conversation hosted a year and a half earlier by Jonathan Barlow, on his blog (see: http://www.barlowfarms.com/index.html?cm_id=1867108). At the time Mr. Barlow was a student in St. Louis, Missouri. Under the heading “St. Louis Architectural Tragedies,” he wrote a short paragraph that provoked an interesting conversation:There are some beautiful old churches in the city of St. Louis that are just waiting for some enterprising congregation to renovate and occupy. But they are decaying, folks. Why did their congregations ever leave them? Why are we spreading out? Why waste these beautiful buildings and the crumbling neighbourhoods surrounding them when we could all move in, renovate, and live together in community? How many of us are really moving out into the boondocks for good reasons?In many places throughout the world, churches have for centuries contributed to the built fabric of human society. While churches have many avenues for cultural activity in service of the common good, I am pleading for renewed attention to the architectural good that churches can do in the cities of North America. 1. WHERE THERE IS NO VISION, THE PEOPLE PERISH. The urban psychologist Frank Mills, reflecting on Proverbs 29:18 (“Where there is no vision, the people perish”) and Joel 2:28 (“Your old men will dream dreams, and your young men will see visions”) during the Christmas season of 2004 (see: http://urbanparadoxes.blogspot.com/2004_12_ 01_urbanparadoxes_archive.html), asked three provocative questions:1. Do the people of our poorer urban neighborhoods lack shared neighborhood vision because their circumstances rob them of the capacity of vision, or have urban social agencies and urban planners bought into this myth, perhaps unconsciously, to justify their agenda? 2. What would happen if urban planners and urban social agencies came together to assist in the creation of shared neighborhood vision and then allowed it to form future direction, both for solving urban issues and creating sustainable urban neighborhoods? 3. Lastly, given that these passages are from the Bible, what is the role of faith communities in creating a vision for urban sustainability? How do we motivate faith communities to assist in the creation of such a vision in their neighborhoods?I would argue that the primary contribution churches can make to a renewed vision in and for city neighbourhoods is by being themselves. Let the church be the church – and let the reality of church life find expression in the buildings the church inhabits. A church is a community of faith professing in the public realm that Jesus is Lord. This ancient and controversial assertion of the Christian church (see, for example, Romans 10: 9 and 1 Corinthians 12:3) summarizes a belief that God created the cosmos and is sovereign over it; that God became incarnate in the man Jesus to address the problem of evil in his life, death, and resurrection; and that Jesus has the power for the renewal of all creation – for the time being in a limited sense, but in the long run in a comprehensive sense. Churches express this belief in public by prayer, by proclamation of the teachings of the Bible, by the sacramental celebration of the mysteries of God’s redemptive acts, and by the formation of the character of its members in and through the life of the community of faith. Churches have also from their earliest history provided care for the poor and needy. The life of the church has a distinctive rhythm. In some church communities that rhythm is daily, in the celebration of the eucharist and prayers at designated hours. In most church communities that rhythm is weekly, centered on the Sunday services of worship. In many church communities that rhythm is also yearly, following liturgical contours anchored in Christmas and Easter. Throughout the past twenty centuries, the Christian church has expressed its public mission in the buildings it has used and built. Its spaces for prayer, teaching, sacramental celebration and its times of worship and formation express the faith, hope and love that flows from its central profession of the Lordship of Christ. It communicates that faith, hope and love to its neighbours through the buildings themselves – be it the gothic spire signifying the transcendence of God, the monastic hospital offering shelter and respite to pilgrims, the Quaker meeting house signifying the presence of God, or any of the many other built expressions given to the life of the church. We build as we believe; our basic beliefs are built into the very fabric of our cities, towns, and homesteads. This is certainly true also of the buildings of the church. By being what it is and giving expression to that life in its buildings, the church contributes to the vision of a community. Medieval cathedrals and New England meetinghouses alike offered a built centre to the lives of their communities, by their very centrality celebrating the meaningfulness of human society in the creation and under the restorative care of God. Benedictine monasteries and inner city storefront churches signify the presence and care of God in troubled communities. To reiterate the claim I am trying to make here, while the church may contribute to shared neighborhood vision in the city in many ways, the first way in which it does so is as a built expression of its character as the church. 2. WONDERFUL PLACES DELIGHT THE IMAGINATION WHILE OFFERING SOCIAL COMFORT. Architecture is the most social of the arts, as it consciously combines the shaping of places so as to ease inter personal interaction with an attentiveness to the effect of those places on the imagination. It is as everyday an art as cooking food or making clothes, and has as constant an influence on the quality of our lives. The design of places – from a window seat in a family home to a public square in a cosmopolitan centre – is of great importance because of this influence, if nothing else. As churches inhabit existing buildings or build new ones, they should seek to delight the imagination and offer social comfort to the faith community worshipping in these buildings as well as the other people whose lives are affected by the building. No building affects only those who use it directly. A structure changes the visual landscape within which it nestles; it articulates the public spaces upon which it abuts; it replaces the alternative uses possible in the same space. With such affects come responsibility, and in the case of buildings that responsibility lies at the intersection of the social and the aesthetic. I recall an early afternoon meal shared with my daughters on a cool late summer’s day some years ago, in Bryant Park next to the building of the main branch of the New York Public Library. As we ate in this former needle park, we watched children ride the carousel, working folk sitting on the green park chairs with their brown paper bag lunches, a fashion shoot taking place in one of the park’s corners, and, suffusing the scene, the dapple of sunlight rippling through the tall, reedy, breeze-blown plane trees. One of my daughters turned to me and said, “This is how I imagine the New Jerusalem.” That image of the New Jerusalem has been evocative in the civilizations informed by the apocalyptic poetry of the Bible. William Blake’s poem “Jerusalem” has been sung by social activists since Charles Parry set it to music for the British movement of suffragettes. That a simple city park set between skyscrapers can call that image forth for a child speaks to the power of architecture. 3. CHURCHES HELP SHAPE ALL KINDS OF PLACES. “We need Christians and churches everywhere there are people,” writes Tim Keller, pastor of Redeemer Presbyterian Church in New York City in a “A New Kind of Urban Christian” (Christianity Today, May 2006). While contemporary North American churches seem particularly strong in suburban communities, they are also present in urban centres and rural areas. Some churches – for example cathedrals and metropolitan mega-churches – have a significant regional influence; other churches have a particularly powerful local influence, such as that of a parish church on its neighbourhood. The influence of churches is diverse, and includes their influence on the built landscape. A church like the Cathedral of Our Lady of the Angels, in Los Angeles, is designed intentionally to provide a public space in a city shaped by highways. The Episcopalian Falls Church in Virginia – no less influential a Christian congregation, from a global perspective – combines a response to the modes of transport of colonial America, when its first building was built, with a moderated expression of suburban mega-church architecture. While each of these churches responds to their setting, they also help shape that setting. Our Lady of the Angels provides a visual focus to the frenzy of the Los Angeles highway system. Falls Church architecturally communicates an invitation of calm reliability to harried pundits, bureaucrats and politicians. 4. CHURCHES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR RE-INHABITING OLD CITIES. A more expanded version of what I quote Tim Keller as writing above reads as follows: Do I mean that Christians must live in cities? No. We need Christians and churches everywhere there are people! But I have taken up the call of the late James Montgomery Boice, an urban pastor... who knew that evangelical Christians have been particularly unwilling to live in cities. It is this unwillingness that causes the dismal situation lamented by Jonathan Barlow:There are some beautiful old churches in the city of St. Louis that are just waiting for some enterprising congregation to renovate and occupy. But they are decaying, folks. Why did their congregations ever leave them? Why are we spreading out? Why waste these beautiful buildings and the crumbling neighbourhoods surrounding them when we could all move in, renovate, and live together in community? How many of us are really moving out into the boondocks for good reasons?While churches can and should have an influence in every kind of place, in this article I want to plead for churches more consciously striving to be present in North America’s old cities. I live in such a city – Hamilton, Ontario, a former node in the global steel industry, now, like many of the industrial cities in the North American Northeast, struggling to adapt to the changing flows of trade, the further globalization of labour markets, and the resultant loss of its competitiveness as a host city to large steel production plants. I don’t know what Hamilton was like in its heyday – no-one who has read Dickens is surprised that William Blake cursed the “dark satanic mills” of 19th century urban industrial Britain – but a few parts of it today are no less of a wasteland than some of the South African slums in which I’ve walked. Rather than simply forsaking an old industrial city like Hamilton for the surface prosperity of the new suburbs, I want to plead with the church to invest itself into such a struggling community and be present as a revitalizing force within it. The church must do so primarily by being the church, to reiterate what I have written above, even as it temporarily picks up responsibilities that in livelier communities may have been taken care of by other institutions. The presence of the church in an old industrial city communicates hope and the promise of the future to its neighbours. And this sense of hopeful neighbourliness should be expressed also in its architectural effect on the neighbourhood. In an old city like Hamilton, hopeful neighbourliness is more likely than not to involve reinhabiting an abandoned or neglected church building, recovering it for use, refreshing its possibilities for imaginative delight and social comfort, making it useful for the life of the church and hospitable to its neighbours. 5. CHURCHES CAN HELP CULTIVATE URBAN VILLAGES. David Sucher in his book City Comforts: How to Build an Urban Village (City Comforts Inc., 2003) tells of a former mayor of Seattle, Norman B. Rice, making the phrase “urban village” a central part of his administration’s planning efforts. Sucher writes,At first glance the term might seem to be nonsensical and impossible: an oxymoron, the two words contradicting each other. How can you have a place that feels like a village and like a big city at the same time? The village is small, intimate, quiet; one knows the other villagers and may even be related to them. The city is big, busy, diverse, and filled with strangers. Life can be lonely in the big city. […] People want the best of both worlds: the diversity, choice, and independence of the urb and the homeyness and intimacy of the village.According to Sucher, the measure of a city is to be found in the human comfort it offers. He writes,Our society makes the problem of city building far too complicated. We confuse it with grandeur and we confuse it with complex public administration. It is neither. The main task is making people comfortable, the same task faced by the host at a party.According to Allan B. Jacobs in Great Streets (MIT Press, 1993, 2001), great city streets share a number of characteristics: 1. They offer safe, leisurely walking; 2. They offer physical comfort in response to the climate of the city – warmth or sunlight when it is cool, shade and coolness when it is hot, and protection from the wind; 3. They have definition: “They have boundaries, usually walls of some sort or another, that communicate clearly where the edges of the street are, that set the street apart, that keep the eyes on and in the street, that make it a place; 4. They offer a feast for the eyes – trees, architectural features, the movement of light, people moving about; 5. They have a quality of transparency at their edges, at the intersection of the private and public realms – in particular by means of windows and doorways; 6. Their buildings “get along with each other” – “They are not the same but they express respect for one another, most particularly in height and in the way they look”; 7. They are well-maintained – clean, in good repair – with regard to the street surface, furniture and plants, as well as the buildings on the street; and 8. They are imaginatively designed, and constructed with high-quality craft and materials. Kathleen Madden, writing for the Project for Public Spaces in How to Turn a Place Around: A Handbook for Creating Successful Public Spaces (2000) suggests the following as the characteristics of a successful public place: 1. A high proportion of people in groups; 2. A higher than average proportion of women (because women – according to Maddern – tend to be more discriminating about the places they use, perhaps because of choosiness about the seating available, perhaps because of their perceptions about the safety of places); 3. The presence of people of different ages over the course of a day; 4. A variety of possible activities rather than a single use for the place; and 5. Public shows of affection – Madden writes that “There is generally more smiling, kissing, embracing, holding and shaking of hands, and so forth in good public places than in those that are problematic.” At the core of the belief system of the Christian church is the affirmation that the awesome sovereign creator of the universe who asks Job with irony, “Have you commanded the morning since your days began, and caused the dawn to know its place, that it might take hold of the skirts of the earth, and the wicked be shaken out of it?” is at the same time the intimate friend of children, Jesus, who in the accounts of Matthew and Luke tells his followers that not a sparrow that falls to the ground is forgotten before God. Awe and intimacy in our relationship with God can translate into a concern for both the festive and the comforting aspects of city life. 6. URBAN VILLAGE CHURCHES CAN BE ARCHITECTURAL GOOD NEIGHBOURS. David Sucher writes thatArchitects often talk about whether a building ‘talks’ to its neighbors. What they mean is whether a building refers in its own shape and material to the shapes and materials of its neighbors. A lively conversation between buildings means that the buildings relate to each other. The color of one may be picked up and amplified by another or the roofline of another may be mimicked by yet a fourth. A group of musicians will do something similar in their playing. A horn may start with a cluster of notes, and the pattern will be repeated with variations by the other instruments. Buildings are much like their human users. Conversation between buildings, as among humans, is a poignant sign of neighborliness. It is the height of rudeness – though all too often the expected norm in cities – for neighbors to speak not a word to each other for years on end. Buildings that do not talk to their neighbors are also rude.In most old city neighbourhoods churches can be good neighbours by reinhabiting existing church buildings, or by building new buildings that respond in a civil way to the surrounding buildings – mimicking rooflines, picking up colours, as Sucher suggests, and finding further ways of not being architecturally rude. The urban village church should see as part of its architectural vocation the repair of the urban fabric by means of the repair or construction of its own buildings in such a way that the neighbourhood is aesthetically and socially knitted together rather than torn apart. The architecture of the church should serve its neighbourhood. And the ways in which it does so aesthetically are closely connected with the ways in which it does so socially. 7. CHILDREN ON SAFE STREETS ARE A SIGN OF NEIGHBOURHOOD HEALTH. The Old Testament prophet Zechariah offers a vision of the restoration of God’s purposes for the earth in which “Old men and old women shall again sit in the streets of Jerusalem, each with staff in hand because of great age. And the streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls playing in its streets.” When people think of relocating to city neighbourhoods, one of the things that worry them is how safe they will be – and often, more intensely, how safe their children will be. Jeff Schmidt, responding to the blog entry by Jonathan Barlow quoted above, writes about relocating to a city neighbourhood: “One of the biggest obstacles for me is concern for the safety of my children.” Mr. Barlow himself asks of life in an old city neigbourhood: “Do you really want to be scared on a daily basis?” Jane Jacobs famously wrote that healthy neighbourhoods depend on “eyes on the street” – the presence of people who pay attention to what is going on, and who care enough to respond appropriately. David Sucher, following Jane Jacobs’ lead, writes that safety in the city requires “the creation of spaces where people are present and can observe each other in a form of mutual protection and where they have enough sense of ownership of the street that they will intervene in some way when trouble appears.” Sucher offers many practical suggestions: scattering several tiny police stations throughout the city; putting cops on bikes; making the street an interesting place that attracts people and invites them to linger, by opening up storefronts to the street; allowing – no, encouraging street vendors; placing the entrances of homes so that they are visible from the surrounding homes; opening stairways up so that people can see what is going on in them, thereby making them less creepy – think of the stairwell of a city parking garage. Sucher reflects the feelings of almost all the families I know when he writesChildren are like the canaries in a coal mine: an indicator species of urban health. Children are small and vulnerable and need to be protected. If a city lacks children, it is because parents have assessed the environment and have decided, one family after another over the privacy of the dining room table, to remove to a safer place. But where parents won’t raise children, we might all hesitate to live, for such a place presents an environment uncomfortable, noisy, and dangerous.Sucher suggests that city design should take into account th0e physical comfort of children – for example, by providing many places where parents can change their children’s diapers, and should take into account the need to play, by providing and encouraging many small playgrounds: in restaurants and throughout shopping districts, and in places where children have to wait, like the connecting places in the transport infrastructure – such as at bus stops or ferry terminals. Church buildings very often host the children of their own congregation, for church school and other activities, and have the kinds of facilities that can easily be made available for birthday celebrations and other child-oriented events. This is one way in which a church building can easily contribute to its neighbourhood – by offering a public place for neighbourhood children to play, and by providing publicly accessible washrooms – often hard to come by on city streets, and when available often in poor repair. 8. START WITH THE PETUNIAS. David Sucher argues: “We should choose the simplest and most economical means of solving a problem rather than the most complex and expensive.” In tackling the design problems of the contemporary city, he suggests that we should “Do simple things now.” Kathleen Madden in How to Turn a Place Around offers a helpful beginning guideline: start with the petunias. She writes thatIn creating or changing a public space, small improvements help to garner support along the way to the end result. They indicate visible change and show that someone is in charge. Petunias, which are low cost and easy to plant, have an immediate visible impact. On the other hand, once planted, they must be watered and cared for. Therefore, these flowers give a clear message that someone must be looking after the space.I have been surprised by how unfriendly church buildings can be, even on some of the better city streets in North America. I recall walking past the windowless façade of a church on a lively street in The Beach neighbourhood of Toronto and thinking that it was the worst stretch of sidewalk on an otherwise fine street. Although it was an older building, the lack of doorways, windows, or articulation of any kind in the long wall, and the absence of flowerboxes or trellised plants, reminded me of the worst kind of brutalist architecture – the dead expanses around concrete block buildings, so common in institutional buildings built from the 1950s to the 1970s. Most city churches, however, already enliven the streetscape with flowers and trees – a simple start in the church contributing to the cultivation of urban village in old cities. From such a good start, relentless incremental improvements to church buildings and gardens can consistently raise the quality of life in their neighbourhoods. 9. URBAN REVITALIZATION IS SLOW, HARD, SUBTLE WORK. I once heard John Stackhouse of Regent College in Vancouver, BC, speak in a public lecture of cultural renewal as “slow, hard, subtle work.” This is certainly the case with urban revitalization. City churches in their own life as communities of faith and in their neighbourly efforts to help cultivate urban villages are faced with perplexing practical problems and exhausting emotional demands. One response to Jonathan Barlow’s “St. Louis Architectural Tragedies,” written under the pseudonym “Pentamom,” offers a solution to the difficulty city churches have in building sturdy congregations: “Parking lots. I think that’s half the answer. Large inner city churches can’t survive on walk-in business nowadays, and without parking lots, they can’t draw enough attendance.” Joel Garver responds:Parking lots are good, but the church doesn’t necessarily need one of its own. Tenth PCA (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) is in a downtown and has no parking lot and survives just fine. It’s possible in most cities to get some kind of parking permission to park, for instance, on the ‘no parking’ side of a street if there is usually only parking on one side. There are also often other facilities nearby (public parking garages, hospital or public school parking areas) that can be negotiated for space (even for a small fee), especially on Sunday mornings when use is minimal.Pentamom replies:I’m trying to imagine herding my family of five kids through the snow and ice over several blocks (especially if I am unfamiliar with the parking provisions) to get to church. Special provisions for parking (e.g. being allowed to park on the wrong side of the street on Sunday mornings) don’t help folks unfamiliar with the area, when all they see is ‘no parking’ signs and nowhere to park. So while it might be comforting to talk about why parking need not be an issue, I think that if you’re actually going to take the step of establishing a church in the middle of the city, it’s wiser to deal with the fact that for a whole lot of people, it is an issue.Another pseudonymous correspondent, “Bobber,” writes about the neighbourhood lamented by Jonathan Barlow:My old church did a church plant in that very area. It was incredibly difficult work. Lot’s of very poor and dysfunctional people came to the church. It just overtaxed them tremendously. I think you really have to look at this as just like a mission to another country. It takes lots of training and planning.Jeff Schmidt responds:I agree with Bobber, it is hard for us to fully understand the dysfunction of the culture in these areas and its effect on those that live and labor there. Chris, you have a better understanding of this since you worked at the mission. How does one prepare for the daily onslaught of such an environment?The semi-pseudonymous Chris replies:Well, I only worked in that neighborhood three years, so I don’t pretend to be an expert, but at the same time, I did learn a few things. Again, you can’t prepare for the daily onslaught, you learn to deal with it, navigate it, minister to folks in the midst of being incarnated there. There are some helpful things to read, some wise advice that you can get from weathered veterans, but the bottom line is most of the learning is on the job training.While it helps to focus on doing simple things now – planting the petunias – it is important to recognize that simple does not mean easy. The dream of the urban village church, joining with its neighbours in the re-inhabitation and revitalization of an old city neighbourhood, requires more than good will and ingenuity. It requires faith, hope, and love. 10. MONEY IS NOT THE PROBLEM. In How to Turn a Place Around Kathleen Madden writes that in urban revitalization efforts, “all too often, lack of money is used as an excuse for doing nothing,” but that “when money is an issue, this is generally an indication that the wrong concept is at work, not because the plans are too expensive, but because the public doesn’t feel like the place belongs to them.” In my conversations with church folk about the possibility of new faith communities re-inhabiting abandoned or neglected city church buildings, the difficulties mentioned focus on the safety of children and the lack of money. Restoring and retrofitting a dilapidated old church building for contemporary use is without a doubt costly; heating and cooling it is far more costly than would be the case for a new building. The architectural flourishes and neighbourly amenities suggested in this article come with a cost. But I think the church can learn from people like Ms. Madden. Based on the experience of the Project for Public Spaces, Ms. Madden suggests that 1. Small-scale, inexpensive improvements can be more effective at drawing people into spaces than major big-bucks projects; 2. Developing the ability to effectively manage a space is more critical to success than a large financial investment; 3. If the community is a partner in the endeavor, people will come forward and naturally draw in others; and 4. When the community’s vision is driving the project, money follows. The vision of the urban village church, when embedded in the grand vision of the glory of God and the love of neighbour taught in the Christian faith, is worthy of the financial resources of the people of God. When urban village church advocates develop the necessary and demonstrable skills in management, and when churches in old city neighbourhoods recognize the importance of managing their buildings for the aesthetic delight and social comfort of their own faith communities and their neighbours, then the immensely affluent churches of North America should take up support of the vision of a network of churches

When Premier Ed Stelmach announced his intention to eliminate homelessness in 10 years, one could only react with delight.There can be no greater goal than to help the destitute and the derelict, particularly in a city in which economic performance virtually eliminated unemployment. Pretty much all of us felt the same way earlier this year when the Calgary Committee to End Homelessness was formed and vowed to present a list of its proposals, perhaps as early as January 2008.In 1996, the city estimated there to be about 650 people living on the streets. By 2004, the number stood closer to 2,500 and by 2006 (the count occurs only every second year) the number was estimated to stand at 3,400. Most people accept that here in the winter of 200712008 there are about 4,000 people living on Calgary's downtown and, more recently, even suburban streets.While we know homelessness will likely never be completely eradicated, the impossibility of the task gives it that much more value. Accepted profiles of the homeless population indicate it is comprised of three primary components – the temporarily homess in transition, the mentally ill and the drug- and alcohol-addicted. There is no reason why a prosperous city shouldn't be able to ensure that people who are temporarily without a home and want one can find shelter. The other two categories are more complex, although there are agencies already in place that have tremendous track records in this field and, if given proper funding, could do even more.Consider the dilemma faced by the Mustard Seed and Salvation Army, for instance. They and other respected institutions struggle for donations from the corporate sector in large part because in the late  20th century many public companies decided that rather than choose between faiths it was best to eliminate giving to all faith-based organizations. Another leading organization, Samaritan's Purse, is under assault by a group dedicated to eradicating it from the public square. So while businesses and schools can and do donate robustly to secular organizations, it is worth considering whether they should reconsider their position. True inclusiveness, after all, cannot and will not be achieved by excluding people on the basis that they believe there is more. Further, these people walk the talk. According to the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, the 32 per cent of religiously active Canadians of all faiths contribute 65 per cent of the nation's charitable donations and the 14 per cent of Canadians over 15 who are religiously active provide 43 per cent of the nation's volunteers and clock 50 per cent of  Canada's volunteer hours.And to quote from CBC foreign correspondent Brian Stewart: "...There is no alliance more determined and dogged in action than church workers, ordained and lay members, when mobilized for a common good. It is these Christians who are right 'On the Front Lines' of committed humanity today and when I want to find that Front, I follow their trail. It is a vast Front stretching from the most impoverished reaches of the developing world to the hectic struggle to preserve caring values in our own towns and cities. I have never been able to reach these front lines without finding Christian volunteers already in the thick of it."Like it or not, these are the nation's Little Red Hens when it comes to battles against poverty and homelessness. And while they are motivated and sustained by their faith (we all are to one extent or another) they are also social workers, addictions counsellors, doctors, nurses and others. The Salvation Army has been managing the plight of the homeless since the 19th century and has learned a thing or two along the way about what works and what doesn't.Hopefully, somewhere among the recommendations to fight homelessness will be the idea of helping those who are already doing the helping and have been for a very long time. You don't have to agree with what they believe. Surely the only thing that matters is that you believe in what they do. And what they do works.

Brief to the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences (Quebec)Introduction: Why Understanding the Language of "secular" and "secularism", "beliefs" and "faith" is Essential to the Work of this Commission. The Centre for Cultural Renewal is dedicated to exploring the important and challenging connections between beliefs (religious and non) culture and the state (law and politics at all levels) in Canada today. In the fifteen years that is has been a registered charity, it has operated on a strictly non-partisan, non-denominational basis seeking to inform public discussion in key areas of contemporary debate. We write, in particular, to this Commission, to suggest that the language employed in this area of accommodation and harmonization is essential in order to move in a fair direction for citizens in the future. The recitals to the Order in Council 95 – 2007, that established the Commission refer, amongst other things, to: "...certain accommodation practices related to cultural differences [which] might call into question the fair balance between the rights of the majority and the rights of minorities." We wish to address a key aspect of this issue—fair balance, and how the language we use to describe what the debate about religion and the state is all about, has a great deal to do with how we subsequently analyze the issues. Just as matters may be overlooked, they may also be assumed in certain words. Assumed in ways that may be shown to be confusing or wrong and that fundamentally affect fairness as we make the difficult determinations of what is fair in sharing the public sphere. In what follows we argue that it is advisable to start examining what fairness entails by looking at the basic language terms we use to describe our most basic concepts. Here that means the language we use to understand faith or beliefs in relation to the surrounding society (here the focus is the state with its central aspects of law and politics). Second, we argue that much of the standard language in this area is confused and confusing. In particular, terms such as "separation of church and state", "secularism", "believers/unbelievers" and "faith communities" tend to overlook key aspects of human being and life in communities which, if properly analyzed, could lead to better terms and better outcomes. We urge the Commission to examine these arguments and recognize the limitations that are present in some of the key terminology used before you in the Mandate and supporting Consultation paper (excellent though both are in many other respects) the Briefs submitted to date and at public hearings.Who is a "Believer" The starting off point for our comments is an observation; "all human beings are believers, the question is not one of belief or non-belief but of what is believed in." Yet how often we hear those who do not believe religion described as "unbelievers." This use of "unbelief" is a clue to other problems that soon follow and build upon it.What is "faith?" As with "belief" so it is with "faith." Everyone has "faith" of some sort and not all faiths are religious. The world is made up, in part, of believers who are parts of communities that have faith in this or that—some of this faith and belief is religious some of it is not. The separation of the world into two sharp divisions—one of "faith" and the other supposedly based upon "non-faith" is inaccurate and works against fairness when overlaid with the framework ("secular" or "secularism") that predisposes analysis against certain kinds of inclusion (religious). One of the implicit suggestions of the contemporary period is that those who are not in "communities of faith" are people of facts and/or that they do not operate out of "faith" but (and here is another false division) "reason" alone. This serves to bracket out religious adherents from other citizens; as the context usually shows, such a bifurcation is usually implicit and unintentional. In combination with other dualistic constructions, however, we shall see that this eventually leads to a general failure to understand relevant matters in a way that leads to accurate analysis of what is actually going on with respect to the state and public policy. When "faith" and "belief" (not necessarily religious) are understood to be aspects of human existence, and public policy based upon beliefs and faith (of some sort as well) we begin to see that the watertight compartments currently being used to insulate and confuse our analysis need to be replaced by better conceptions.Religious Faith and Religions matter to culture Whether our times wish to acknowledge it or not, religion and religious life have been recognized as of great importance in other places facing greater challenges to social cohesion than Canada or Quebec (and this commission's mandate includes looking at places outside Quebec for inspiration). The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for example, has said this about religion: For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, their community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support and nurture and a framework for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights. It affects the believer's view of society and founds the distinction between right and wrong.1Ignoring such insights and moving expressly or by default to minimize the public influence of religion shows extraordinary anti-religious hubris and cultural short-sightedness. Consider this as well. It is known that in Canada, 20% of Canadians do approximately 80% of charitable giving and volunteering. When these "top 20%" are compared with the "bottom 20%" who do nothing or very little in this area, three indicators stand out as statistically significant. It turns out that two of the three most important indicators of "socially embedded" conduct (those that "join", "donate" or "volunteer") are "spiritual" or religious. That is to say, regular attendance at a place of worship (church, synagogue, temple, mosque etc.) and a high rating as to "religiosity" question ("how important is spirituality to your life?"). The third indicator is University education.2 This alone shows that religious belief should be encouraged for the good of society not thwarted because of anti-religious animus, response to bad history or the difficulties of harmonization.Is the Canadian Constitutional Framework Individualistic/Communitarian or Both? Professor John D. Whyte has noted that the Canadian Constitution has not been promulgated upon any individualistic conception of liberalism but, rather, one that respects and nurtures each person's communities or what he calls "the organic society." Moreover, the two kinds of rights protected by the Charter, group rights and individual rights, derive from different conceptions of the proper role of the state, which are both reflected in the Constitution. Where rights conflict in a society any method of resolution will have to examine its principles of living together despite differing beliefs (whether the Quebec Charter, Canadian Constitution or Quebec Human Rights, in this respect makes little difference). Professor Whyte points out that since Confederation, in 1867, the Constitution has provided for group rights in addition to individual rights. S. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, confers language rights that may be asserted by individuals because of their membership in a protected group. Consequently, as Professor Whyte observes: . . . It is impossible to discern in the constitutional text either the clear direction to promote liberal values as wholeheartedly as possible or the direction to sustain communitarian values to the greatest extent possible. The Charter reflects the tension. Of course, it gives impetus to the nation's change to liberalism, but it does not reveal, in any precise way, where the limit should be drawn to protect other political values.3The Canadian model (and there is no suggestion that, on this front, it should be different in Quebec) depicted above does not start with the proposition that either form of right is paramount or will necessarily converge or has a "trump" over other claims, but instead looks for the proper sphere of operation of each. This is a form of structural pluralism which must be respected. Claims that are, therefore, totalistic and which claim to represent in themselves all of "public policy" or "the view of the State" on a matter, where such recognition effectively delegitimizes other legal perspectives, must be rejected as overreaching or, at least, suspect until subjected to further analysis to ensure that they maximally respect legally contestable positions. Totalistic claims for "recognition" by any particular advocacy group do not respect diverse pluralism that holds together notions of group as well as individual rights and a plurality of moral perspectives. Taken together, therefore, we see that all Quebecers, like all Canadians, are necessarily believers that have faith. They are also members of a wide variety of faith communities gathered around whatever it is they believe—whether such beliefs are religious or nonreligious in origin. The beliefs of atheists and agnostics do not have a privileged claim in a society dedicated to equality and fairness.The Nature of the "Secular": The Canadian Supreme Court has Determined that Standard use of "Secular" as Religiously exclusive is not Appropriate in Canada. The same sort of confused use of language applies to the term "secular" but here the use by religious believers is almost exactly the same now days as it is by those who are non-religious believers. Consider how we speak of "religion AND the secular." The term "secular" has changed its meaning over the last century and a half. The term in general usage now means, essentially, free from religion as in "we ought to keep religion out of the schools because they are secular." This was not the original meaning, nor is it a meaning which recognizes the modus vivendi or diversity or pluralism. In short, the term "secular" must have a neutral meaning lest it be taken in an anti-religious direction. Yet if we assume, as many (most) do that the secular is stripped of religion, and that, secondly, the state is "secular" then we have assumed in our use that the state itself is, or must be, stripped of religion. But is this correct; is it fair? Now we must ask: is it legal? All citizens, as a matter of fact, as set out above, make their decisions in life based upon their beliefs. On one level, therefore, we are all "believers." The question is: "what do we believe in" and "for what reasons" and does the origin of our beliefs mean that some people (or some beliefs) have less importance in a society that says it will respect the ability of citizens to have the fundamental right and freedom to "belief" and "expression" in addition to "conscience and religion." Courts have, recently, come to acknowledge that any pre-emptive exclusion of "religion" from the category of "beliefs" or "secular" that may operate in the public sphere of society, is an unwarranted attack on the freedom of "conscience and religion" set out in Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This recognition is of great significance for public policy (in all provinces including Quebec) but it has yet to be widely understood as such. To allow only the beliefs of atheists and agnostics to have any public relevance is not to treat other beliefs fairly and those who hold them as equal citizens. To allow only those beliefs that emanate from the convictions of atheists and agnostics to have public relevance is discriminatory against religious beliefs just as much as to allow only religious beliefs to have public relevance would be discriminatory against non-religious believers. The principles of a free and democratic society require that all citizens are entitled to have their viewpoints respected within certain very broad parameters. It is not simply a matter of how beliefs are expressed but of what communities are nurtured and created by the analysis that must be examined. To the greatest extent possible public policy must try to encourage the diverse communities of belief that make up the tapestry of any "plural" society. The "secular" (a better term would be "public sphere") is, properly understood, a realm of competing faith/belief claims, not a realm of "non-faith" or "non-belief" claims because, strictly speaking, there can be no such realm. Human life and legislation are inescapably moral however implicit such morals are. In contemporary usage, "secular schools", "secular government", etc. are generally understood to mean non-religious or not influenced by religion or religious principles. We suggest that this is because we have adopted a secularist (which may be atheistic, agnostic or even religious) definition of "secular" rather than a richer and more properly inclusive conception. The separation of church and state is, after all, a jurisdictional distinction important to both the church and the state. A valid separation should not preclude a valid cooperation between church and state. Most religious groups in the west, for example, do not in fact want the state to run "the church" or vice versa. When we are tempted to use the term "secular" when we mean "the public sphere" or "the state" we would be better to say "public sphere" or "state" as these are free of the religiously exclusive baggage that currently encumbers use of the term "secular." When the Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board case came before the Supreme Court of Canada, all nine judges 1agreed with the reasoning of McKenzie J. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal as to the religiously inclusive meaning of "secular"—a usage in direct opposition to its general use. This means that for the purposes of Canadian law, "the secular" now means religiously inclusive not exclusive.4 As such it marks a strong divergence from "secularism" (recognized historically to be against the public involvement of religion) or contemporary forms of "laicism" such as evidenced in France or "strict separationalism" as seen in some quarters of the United States of America. Mr. Justice Gonthier for himself and Justice Bastarache, said this about the "secular": 137 In my view, Saunders J. below erred in her assumption that "secular" effectively meant "non-religious". This is incorrect since nothing in the Charter, political or democratic theory, or a proper understanding of pluralism demands that atheistically based moral positions trump religiously based moral positions on matters of public policy. I note that the preamble to the Charter itself establishes that "... Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law". According to the reasoning espoused by Saunders J., if one's moral view manifests from a religiously grounded faith, it is not to be heard in the public square, but if it does not, then it is publicly acceptable. The problem with this approach is that everyone has "belief" or "faith" in something, be it atheistic, agnostic or religious. To construe the "secular" as the realm of the "unbelief" is therefore erroneous. Given this, why, then, should the religiously informed conscience be placed at a public disadvantage or disqualification? To do so would be to distort liberal principles in an illiberal fashion and would provide only a feeble notion of pluralism. The key is that people will disagree about important issues, and such disagreement, where it does not imperil community living, must be capable of being accommodated at the core of a modern pluralism. [emphasis added].Needless to say, it will take some time before the full implications of this judgment are understood in relation to how a religiously inclusive conception of the public sphere functions in relation to different belief systems. The language in the area needs to change and, at the very least the term "secular" and the "believer/unbeliever" dichotomy should be avoided in favour of terms that more accurately convey what is meant and what is fair in the circumstances. The same is true, a fortiori, with respect to "secularism" and it is to that term that we now turn.What Secularism does and does not mean. Like the term "secular", the term "secularism" is not often examined but when it is we argue that its historical meaning is such that we should challenge fundamentally any idea that "secularism" is a valid principle upon which to base an open and democratic society such as Canada or a province such as Quebec. Iain Benson has written about this historical background elsewhere5 and we will not repeat that analysis here except to draw to the attention of the Commission that "secularism" is not a term that, properly understood, furthers the kind of religious inclusivity or relation between the state and public policy that we need to seek in Quebec or the rest of Canada. Alternative terminology can and should be found in place of this term, laden as it is, with particular anti-religious intent and deep contemporary ambiguity. If an inclusive public sphere is sought that is what should be discussed. "Secularism" of any sort just confuses the issue.Conclusion: Avoid "one size fits all conceptions" and terms such as "secularism" as we move towards an open and inclusive public sphere. Only a richer conception of how citizens with differing belief systems can co-exist will solve the dilemma posed by erroneous uses of key terms in aid of universal consensus. What is clear is that claims for "neutrality" based upon the prior exclusion of religious beliefs but the inclusion of other beliefs under misuse of terms' such as "believer/unbeliever", "secular" or "faith" fail to support a proper approach to accommodation of differing beliefs. Approaches to "pluralism", "equality" or "secularism" that implicitly or expressly see us moving towards eventual agreement on all matters, need to be rejected as inconsistent with human freedom or a proper diversity and accommodation. The State through its primary public policy drivers of law and politics should keep ever before us the need to find ways in which people who do not believe the same things can, nonetheless, share the public sphere and even work together in their joint task and privilege of citizenship. To do this going forwards requires a re-thinking and re-formulation of some of the central terms in our understanding of religions and the state, terms that have, as this Brief has attempted to show in the pages above, been much influenced by ideological developments intended to limit and exclude the public relevance of religious beliefs and religious communities. When religious believers and their communities are accorded the involved respect they are due then and only then will we see a corresponding support for public institutions and a greater sense of citizenship and provincial or national confidence and pride. Neither separation on a "strict separation" model nor laicism/secularism can provide this firm future for Quebec.THE FOREGOING IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.Notes 1 Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) para. 36. See, generally, for the Scope of Freedom of Religion in South Africa (much of which has been based upon Canadian decisions) Iain Currie and Johan de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 5th ed. 336 – 357.2 Personal communication, 2006, with Dr. Paul Reed, Senior Social Scientist at Statistics Canada, Ottawa.3 John D. Whyte, "Is the Private Sector Affected by the Charter?" in Righting the Balance: Canada's New Equality Rights, L. Smith, ed.(Saskatoon: The Canadian Human Rights Reporter Inc., 1986) 145 at 177-1784 Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 749 (Can.) at 749 (Can.).. Madam Justice McLachlin, who wrote the decision of the majority, accepted the reasoning of Mr. Justice Gonthier on this point thus making his the reasoning of all nine judges in relation to the interpretation of "secular."5 Iain T. Benson, "Considering Secularism" in, Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy (Montreal: McGill/Queens, 2004) 83 – 93

Federal legislation designed to increase voter turnout could backfire by disengaging the people who currently display the nation's highest levels of civic participation. Bill C-16 would increase the number of advance polling days to five, including polls on two Sundays.The government argues that Sunday advance polls will increase voter turnout, but it seems more likely that by imposing itself on a day of some stature for people of the nation's dominant faith community, voter turnout will instead further decline.Bill C-16 amends the Canada Elections Act to establish a "Last Day of Advance Polling" on the Sunday immediately before election day. This "last day" would have the same number of polling places open from noon till 8 p.m. as on election day. In addition, there would be four consecutive advance polling days on the 10th, ninth, eighth and seventh days before election day -- Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday -- the week before the election.At committee, Government House Leader Peter Van Loan testified that Sunday advance polls are in response to research indicating that people who don't vote point to the lack of available opportunities to cast their ballots. Van Loan also pointed out that Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec already have advance polls on Sundays. He didn't say, however, whether Sunday polling resulted in increased voter turnout in those provinces.In Saskatchewan, no particular day of the week is proscribed as election day. Advance poll days are set by counting back from whatever day is designated as Election Day, so advance poll days may or may not fall on Sunday. In this year's Manitoba general election, advance polls were held on Sunday for the first time. Voter turnout this year was 56.75 per cent, up but not decisively so from the 54.17 per cent turnout in 2003.In Quebec, Sunday polling was implemented in 1979. In 1976, before Sunday voting, voter turnout was 85.27 per cent.In 1981, with Sunday voting, turnout was lower at 82.49 per cent. In the most recent Quebec provincial election this year, voter turnout was 71.23 per cent.Representatives of various faith communities who appeared in committee hearings spoke with one voice: Parliament should reconsider holding advance polls on Sundays.Douglas Cryer, director of public policy for the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, noted that C-16 may depress voter turnout among those one-in-four Canadians who regularly attend religious services on Sunday.Based on their analysis of Statistics Canada's 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey of 41,666 citizens, landed immigrants and temporary residents, political scientists L.S. Tosutti and Mark Wang found that those who attend Christian services weekly or monthly are noticeably more likely than other Canadians to vote.Is it good public policy to effectively discourage a quarter or more of the Canadian population, with a proven track record of civic engagement, from participating as voters in elections? What message does the government send these voters if it insists on pushing forward with advance polls on Sundays?According to the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada on the January 2006 election, there were 21,403 poll locations and 2,767 advance polling places during the 2006 general election. Of the polling places on election day, 12.3 per cent were located in church facilities.On advance poll days, 18.8 per cent of polling places were located in church facilities.This does not include church schools, hospitals or other facilities operated by churches.When Chief Electoral Officer Marc Mayrand appeared before the House committee on C-16, he indicated that 11 per cent of all polling places for both election day and advance polls -- some 2,200 -- were located in "churches or other places of worship." As he suggested, many -- if not most -- church facilities would not be available for Sunday advance polls.If C-16 is passed and Sunday advance polls are implemented, it seems unlikely voter turnout would increase. The evidence suggests Sunday advance polls would make it more difficult for returning officers across Canada to find suitable space for polling places.More to the point, C-16 may well reduce voter turnout among churchgoers -- the quarter or more of Canadians who are proven to be the most likely to vote.Given those conditions, it makes sense for the government to head back to the drawing board on Bill C-16.Ray Pennings is vice-president of research for the Work Research Foundation.

INTRODUCTION What contributes to sustainable urban growth and development? This is a common question of concern facing all participants in this year’s World Urban Forum, from urban planners and urban business professionals to Non-Governmental Organizations and local community associations and groups. The focus of the forum this year is on “turning ideas into action.” From this diverse group of stakeholders has emerged a number of key areas for dialogue and action, attempting to address this shared concern. This list includes: urban planning and management, energy policies and practices, urban safety and security, affordable housing and infrastructure development, to name a few. These observations lead us to the question at the heart of this paper: What is the role of faith communities in the growth and development of sustainable cities? It is striking that this type of question rarely, if ever, enters the discussion around planning for urban development and sustainability. It is encouraging to see that one of the mobile workshops at the World Planners Conference, a gathering of urban planners from around the world that is being held in Vancouver prior to the World Urban Forum, highlights the role that faith communities have in shaping and influencing their neighbourhoods. However, it is fair to say that among urban planners and other urban civic and business professionals there remains a lack of understanding concerning the potential contribution of faith communities to urban centres. What exactly is the role of faith communities in our urban centres? How could these communities contribute to their sustainability? The contribution of this paper to that conversation will be quite specific. The focus will be to assess the potential contribution of one stream of faith communities in our urban centres: the emergence of “missional churches.” Among Christian faith-communities throughout North America, “missional churches” represent an emerging movement that is bringing renewal and transformation to many Christian churches of diverse backgrounds and traditions. At the heart of this movement is the effort among these Christian churches to be actively engaged in their local communities, and to contribute to the health and vitality of their cities. The issues facing our cities are diverse and complex. The need for collaboration among diverse stakeholders is widely recognized. While the contribution of “missional churches” is limited in scope, the role of these churches can be significant. In order to demonstrate this we will look at three key contributions of missional churches to their urban neighbourhoods: bridging social capital, partners in community development, and agents of vocational and cultural renewal. BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL The importance of social capital for sustainable cities is widely recognized. On a global scale, the World Bank continues to look at the importance of social capital or “social cohesion” in order for societies and cities to prosper and for development to be sustainable. As they see it, “social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions.” In the Canadian context we are indebted to the work of Jane Jacobs and her ability to inspire us to see the interconnected webs and layers in our cities, particularly in our local neighbourhoods and streets, and to discover how people interact with the rich tapestry of life in urban neighbourhoods. The benefits of social capital for cities and urban neighbourhoods are manifold. Citing Robert Putnam’s work, Mark Smith mentions a few of the concrete benefits: child development is powerfully improved by strong social capital; public spaces are cleaner; people are friendlier; streets are safer; institutions and businesses flourish; and individual health and well-being improve. For urban growth and development to be sustainable, the strength of social capital should be of vital concern and a central element in the discussion. Let us consider a couple of the key components in the development of strong social capital in urban communities. Putnam’s work and others like Fukyama have demonstrated that two of the key components for building strong social capital are trust and interpersonal connectedness. One challenge facing our urban centres is the incredible array of diversity, and the potential threats and challenges this diversity brings to sustaining trust and interpersonal connections. Nick Pearce cites recent evidence “marshaled by theorists of social capital, particularly in the USA, that increased ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels of trust and civic-ness between citizens.”10 Ethnic diversity is only one variable of diversity. Our urban centres are noted for their rich diversity along many lines: social, economic, worldview, religious, education, employment, and housing. Pearce argues that trust is not necessarily at odds with increased diversity, and that trust is not achievable through political action or urban planning policy: “Interpersonal trust and civic belonging are themselves often forged through social struggles, and the creation and maintenance of institutions and practices that generate and sustain other-regarding virtues.”11 What types of institutions exist in our cities that “generate and sustain other-regarding virtues?” In other words, what institutions do we find in our cities that have the potential to develop and sustain what social capital theorists refer to as “bridging” social capital: the kind of social capital that accommodates diversity and is able to encompass people of many different social groups we find in our urban centres? In a recent study focused on Canadian cities, Aizlewood and Pendakur demonstrate that ethno-cultural diversity is not a major factor for the accumulation of social capital in Canada as it is in the United States.12 Rather, the dominating factor that affects social capital in Canada is community size: In three of the five models – participation, interpersonal trust and seeing friends – the larger the city of residence, the less likely people are to participate, trust, and socialize. Generalized trust in cities is reduced because familiarity is a more selective, network-based phenomenon.13 So the problem seems to be in the very process of urbanization – the larger the city, the greater the negative effect on social capital. What is striking is the remedy suggested by this study – higher levels of education and income. Simply stated, the higher the levels of education and income among urban dwellers, the greater the social capital. “Based on our research, controlling diversity is neither justifiable nor realistic, but more importantly, does not appear to be the answer. Education and income appear to be far more effective levers for affecting social capital.” Are these the only “levers for affecting social capital” in our Canadian cities? What about the institution of the church – particularly, emerging missional churches? Missional churches are churches that recognize the power of their associational life to generate and sustain the “otherregarding” virtues so vital to the strength of bridging social capital. Missional churches will often refer to themselves as “alternative communities” and by this they have in mind the power of communal life together that is marked by its diversity and embrace of the “other.” This is striking. Historically, churches have likely been noted, instead, for their “bonding social capital”: the strong social cohesion that often functioned to exclude those who were “other” or different. Increasingly, missional churches are reflecting the diversity of their urban neighbourhoods and demonstrating a capacity for fostering connection and trust among a diversity of people.14 This capacity has been noted by urban pastor and missiologist Mark Gornik in his celebrated To Live in Peace: Biblical Faith and the Changing Inner City. Gornik argues that we need a structural change in our whole way of thinking about sustainable cities and the role of the church. Often advocates of a civil society look to the role of churches as “mediating institutions” which, along with other local community groups of this category, provide a buffer between the market economy and the government. Churches are much more than this, argues Gornik. Missional churches are “living communities of truth, grace, and reconciliation” where Christian identity cuts across every other dividing line found in our urban neighbourhoods. 15 These communities have the resources and capacity not only to engender “other-regarding virtues,” but to be places where bridging social capital is nurtured and experienced in the urban neighbourhoods of our cities.16 At the heart of this dynamic is the ability of these missional church communities to locate identity and the personal contribution of diverse community members in categories that supercede economic, educational, or ethnic stratification and diversity. Simply put, they live together in “reconciled diversity” that helps them form “alternative communities” where the “other” is embraced and encouraged to contribute. For these churches, their ability to embrace the “other” and live in community amidst a rich ethnic, social, economic, educational, and employment diversity is central to their mission and a powerful witness to their message.17 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Missional churches are building on a tradition of faith-communities who actively engage in local community development. While recent studies, particularly in the U.S., indicate that the contribution of faith-communities to urban community development is not always as grandiose as some recent advocates of “Faith- Based Initiatives,” have suggested, there is a long history in both the U.S. and Canada of strong faith-community involvement in community development and social services.18 Of particular interest are the contributions made by missional churches who are involved in “asset-based community development.” Anyone familiar with community development theory and practice will know the work of John McKnight of Northwestern University and his leadership of the “asset-based community development” institute.19 McKnight’s work extends to Canada and is beginning to take hold in various cities and local communities. A notable example is the profound influence of the “asset-based community development” movement in the community-based research network of Ottawa.20 This approach to community developments focuses effort on five categories of community resources that are leveraged for development: the skills and talents of people; network of voluntary associations; strengths of local institutions; physical property and land; and the local economy. Rans and Altman argue that faith-communities have two particularly significant contributions to make in asset-based community development: community organization and partnerships in development.21 The tradition of faith-based community organizing has a track-record of benefiting local community development efforts along various lines: contribution of leaders to community efforts; contribution of physical meeting space and presence in local community; added “moral authority” to community agenda items; and contribution of funds and other human resources to build stronger communities.22 Building on this legacy, missional churches are finding their places as real partners in urban community development work. Their contribution to this is based on their assets as genuine community partners. Rans and Altman indicate the particularly unique position of missional churches in helping identify and mobilize community assets; in aligning the resources within their own faith-community with the community assets; investing in community relationship building to create connections between community partners; and their contribution as powerful institutions in local communities.23 These potential contributions of missional churches to our urban landscape are fitting for the Canadian context. A study conducted by the Council of Europe on cultural policy and cultural diversity in Canada bears this out.24 According to this study, one of the pressing needs at the Canadian urban micro-level is the need for building better linkages between urban planning and community development. In particular, this study notes that the need for urban planning to adequately deal with issues of cultural diversity will require not only changing perspective in planning theory but engaging in planning practices that carefully examine and listen to the local institutions that shape urban development and cultural life.25 The need is for “building multi-sector partnerships linking grassroots groups, government, business, academia, media, and non-governmental organizations in each city” (48 ). Missional churches are one set of partners at the local level that have the potential to contribute to this linkage between urban planning and grassroots urban community development partners. For missional churches, this partnership and collaboration with other urban community development partners is another central aspect to their mission and vision as an institution. They see their public service and partnership in community development as their public witness in local neighbourhoods – a notion much broader than older notions of “proselytizing” or other efforts focused on institutional growth and success. At the heart of their self-identity is their desire to seek the broader well-being and vitality of their neighbourhood – an identity that is rooted for them in the belief in a complete transformation of the entirety of human life.26 This vision of missional churches is not specific to the North American context as recent work on an international scale has demonstrated the possibilities and power of missional churches in a variety of urban community development work.27 VOCATIONAL AND CULTURAL RENEWAL One of the challenges in effective urban planning is developing policies and strategies for planning that publicly engage the diversity of urban dwellers. Indeed, the challenges around this whole theme are the focus of one of the major dialogue sub-themes at the World Urban Forum this year. No doubt part of what contributes to the growing complexity of this challenge is not only the diverse immigrant and ethnic populations in our major cities, but the growing differentiation of urban networks no longer defined solely by neighbourhood location. This is the challenge of connecting various urban networks, so aptly described as the “engines of urban sustainability” by one of the networking event planners for the World Urban Forum.28 By “urban networks,” we do not have in mind the innovative design concept of Peter Calthorpe, founder of the Congress for New Urbanism.29 Rather, we have in mind the specialized networks found in every major urban centre. The networks that are often found in the different vocational sectors of the city: legal, health care, finance, education, and marketing, to name a few. Increasingly, these formal and informal networks are some of the main conduits through which urban dwellers connect and find community. Missional churches are sensitive to these urban dynamics and, have the potential to contribute to the creation of these urban networks and, through them, become agents of vocational and cultural renewal. Let’s consider this briefly. First, missional churches are intentional in the creation of urban vocational networks. Redeemer Presbyterian Church in New York City is one example of a missional church that is intentional in the creation of urban networks. Currently they have six networks formed whose goals are to equip, connect and mobilize leaders in their professional and industry sectors toward excellence for the common good of the city.30 What is the value of urban networks for sustainability of our cities? On the one hand urban networks offer peer support for urban dwellers who strive for excellence in their vocational work in these various sectors. The added value of peer support networks and informal community gatherings is hard to quantify, but no doubt the liveability of urban neighbourhoods is dependent on the webs of connection among urban people, their spaces, and their places of work. New Urbanism planning is sensitive to these realities and intentional in the design and creation of space that fosters connections among different spheres of urban life. Urban vocational networks are also agents of vocational renewal. Missional churches emphasize the creation of networks that contribute to cultural production, and they strive to share best practices that motivate toward excellence in the workplace. The goal is not “value-assimilation” but, rather, engagement in vocational life in a way that contributes to vocational excellence and renewal. At Redeemer Presbyterian, New York City, this has led to the cultivation of an “Entrepreneurship Forum” whose aim is to establish an infrastructure to advise, serve, and fund Christian entrepreneurs who seek to create citychanging, culture-renewing ventures.31 What other institution in our cities is seeking to intentionally create urban networks and leverage them to foster vocational and culture renewing ventures? For missional churches, the passion for networks and vocational renewal is rooted in their desire to nurture communities in which Christians are equipped to work with distinctiveness while being engaged in cultural production. Missional churches are devoted to supporting people in their vocational fields out of concern for the well-being of their cities and the belief in the inherent goodness of their vocational lives and cultural production. These are not churches seeking to exist in ghettoized isolation where value assimiliation is the goal destination for their educational activities. Instead, these churches have shifted to a paradigm where the focus of their educational activities is the nurturing of urban vocational networks.32 With this focus, these churches aim to make a vital contribution to the common good of our cities and to the various professional and industry sectors that compose our urban landscapes. CONCLUSION Sustainable cities are a common concern for both the urban planner and the missional church. This is a concern rooted in different motivations and shaped by divergent traditions. Yet the emergence of missional churches can be seen as another bright spot on the urban landscape, a new stakeholder committed to the vitality and sustainability of our urban centres or a major player in sustainable urban growth and development. This paper has argued that regardless of your answer, the missional church is a contributor that should not be ignored, particularly when we move from the macro to the micro level and do the hard work of “turning ideas into action”—the theme of this year’s World Urban Forum. Missional churches are institutions and faith-communities committed to our increasingly urban world and its realities. They possess the resources and potential to make a contribution in bridging social capital, partnering in community development, and functioning as agents of vocational and cultural renewal. They are impelled by a vision that looks to an urban future for all humanity – an urban future noted for its rich diversity, wild beauty, and life-giving vitality.   Notes 1. See brochure and program outline for the 2006 World Urban Forum. Available at: http://www.unhabitat.org/wuf/2006/documents/WUF3Bro_small.pdf. 2. See list of “Dialogues” for the 2006 World Urban Forum at: http://www.wuf3-fum3.ca/en/agenda_dialogues.shtml. 3. See the program brochure available at: http://www.mppi.mb.ca/conferences/2006/WPC2006_PrelimProg.pdf. 4. See Michael Van Pelt and Richard Greydanus, Living on the Streets: The Role of the Church in Urban Renewal for a description and one explanation of this reality. 5. This movement has spread beyond North America, to include local expressions in Western Europe, southern Africa, and Australia/New Zealand. Our focus will be on the North American context and specifically focus on the Canadian context. See, for example the following: http://www.gocn.org/; http://www.deepsight.org/deepsight/ds.htm; and http://www.gospel-culture.org.uk/. 6. See www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm for details on their extensive international work on measuring and strengthening social capital. 7. See especially The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 1996, New York: Random House. 8. M.K. Smith, “Social Capital,” The Encyclopedia of Informal Education, 2001 www.infed.org/biblio/social_capital.htm 9. R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone. The collapse and revival of American community, 2000, New York: Simon and Schuster and Fukuyama, F. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, 1996, New York: Free Press. 10. N. Pearce, “Diversity versus Solidarity: A New Progressive Dilemma?,” 2004, Available at: http://www.whitlam.org/its_time/19/pearce.html. Pearce cites the work. 11. Ibid. 12. Amanda Aizlewood and Ravi Pendakur, 2004, “Ethnicity and Social Capital in Canada”, Strategic Research and Analysis, Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada, p. 18. 13. Aizlewood and Pendakur, 19. 14. See Living on the Streets: The Role of the Church in Urban Renewal, Work Research Foundation, 2005, Michael Van Pelt and Richard Greydanus. This study documents the way missional churches in Hamilton, ON are transcending the diverse social boundaries that have existed in urban neighbourhoods (p. 19-20). 15. Mark Gornik, To Live in Peace: Biblical Faith and the Changing Inner City, 2002, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, p. 18-19. 16. Gornik cites the important study done in the US by Mark Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, Princeton University Press, 2001. As noted on the back of this book, Warren “offers the first in-depth treatment of how to rebuild the social capital of America’s communities while promoting racially inclusive, democratic participation.” Warren looks particularly at the vital role of religious congregations in this process. 17. See L. Barret, Treasure in Clay Jars: Patterns in Missional Faithfulness, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans (2004): 74-83 . 18. See A. Farnsely, “Assessing the Roles of Faith-Based Organizations in Community Development,” Recent Research Results, November 2001, pp. 1-2 and Ron Cnaan, “Our Hidden Safety Net,” Brookings Review 17, no. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 50-53 . For a more balanced perspective on the US situation, see A Revolution of Compassion: Faith-Based Groups as Full Partners in Fighting America’s Social Problem by Dave Donaldson and Stanley Carlson-Thies. 19. See their site: http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/abcd.html. 20. See, for example: http://www.spcottawa.on.ca/CBRNO_website/Participatory_Social_Research.htm. Edmonton, Victoria, Vancouver, and Kitchener-Waterloo are other Canadian cities who are effectively engaging the asset-based tools for community planning and development. See http://www.neighbourtoneighbour.ca/links.html for links. 21. “Asset-Based Strategies for Faith Communities,” Chicago: ACTS Publications, 2002. 22. “Asset-Based Strategies for Faith Communities,” p. 5. 23. Ibid., pp. 6-8. 24. Greg Baeker, “National Report: Canada,” Council of Europe Transversal Study Project on Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity, 2001. Found at: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co operation/culture/Completed_projects/Transversal/CCCULT_2001_5_EN.pdf?L=E. 25. Baeker, p 47ff. 26. See M. Minatrea, Shaped By God’s Heart: The Passion and Practice of Missional Churches, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004: p. 126-140. 27. See “Towards the Transformation of Our Cities/Regions,” Lausanne Occasional Paper No. 37, produced for the Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization in Pattaya, Thailand, September 9 to October 5, 2004. Accessed at: http://community.gospelcom.net/lcwe/assets/LOP37_IG8.pdf 28. This particular networking and training event is being planned by “Federacion Latinoamericana de Ciudades, Municipios y Asociaciones (FLACMA), see brochure, p.6. 29. See, http://www.calthorpe.com/ for a sampling of Peters’ influential work and theory. 30. See http://www.faithandwork.org/ for a description of these groups and the type of activities. There are currently networks in the following sectors: arts, education, financial services, health care, legal, and marketing/advertising. 31. See http://www.faithandwork.org/forum.php for details. 32. See Tim Keller, The Missional Church, June 2001, found at: http://www.redeemer2.com/resources/papers/missional.pdf  

  The public funding of private religious schools was the flash point, and for John Tory   the tipping point, of the Ontario election. But none of the three leading parties   evidently thought to ask the faith-based education movement whether they were   inclined to accept funding. According to the authors, about half these private schools   weren’t. In effect, much ado about nothing, at least as to how the debate was framed.As Ontario students enjoyed a break from regular classes this summer the heads of Conservative political enthusiasts were spinning with not-so-novel visions for the provision of equitable religious schooling in Ontario. What followed was a flawed and shallowly debated education policy proposal which sank the provincial Conservative campaign in the 2007 election. Rather than bringing Ontarians of different educational perspectives together in debate and conversation on how to improve education through recognizing diversity, whether faith-based or otherwise, this election appears to have driven them further apart. One of the factors inhibiting effective dialogue was the way the debate was framed. By focusing on the question of funding minority religious schooling, the broader and more important issue of educational diversity, equity and inclusion became lost. The debate quickly became about whether government should be involved in religion, and in what respect it would be appropriate to fund particular beliefs. By framing the debate around religion, the focus on educational diversity and inclusivity lost its coherence. Secondary questions became primary ones and that which ought to have been discussed rarely surfaced. How John Tory and his team ever came to agree that the “Davis education plan of the 80’s” could work today is difficult to understand. Historian Michael Bliss was not the only one to raise this caution. Strategists mistakenly imagined the resurrection of this decades-old initiative as a perfect political bone to engage the more socially conservative within the party. Yet Tory’s plan failed at this. The strategists did not catch the message that not all faith-based independent schools were interested in becoming part of the public system. During the election the Association of Christian Schools International (ACSI) which represents 52 schools publicly indicated their unwillingness to get aboard this policy. What rarely surfaced in the debate or in the strategists’ design of the plan was the likelihood that less than half of the Ontario faith-based schools would even consider this proposal. Simply put, Tory failed to capture the imagination or the interest of this community, this on top of his failure to bring social conservatives into the “big tent” of the Conservative campaign coalition in the first place. In reality many of Tory’s problems in reaching this demographic were because his policy was not entirely dissimilar to McGuinty’s. A closer look at both John Tory’s and Dalton McGuinty’s view of education in Ontario shows a very similar plan in a government-designed, government-funded, and government- operated education system. Tory’s plan was to invite these schools and their 53 000 kids into the public education system. McGuinty argued that we must make improvements so we would attract people back into the public system. Consider a statement from Premier McGuinty in 2004. “It’s time to stop the slide in public education that has been marked by [the] disturbing trend [that] the number of children attending private schools has increased by 40 percent over the last eight years.” Cut away the “wedge politics turned upside down” and we have two men driving down two different roads to the same public system. For Tory it was a road of “fairness and principle” to those outside the system. For McGuinty, it became the dance of suggestions of social unrest, segregation and divisiveness. Given the relative similarity of these two proposals, it shouldn’t prove surprising to Ontarians that substantial debate on the topic of educational diversity never really took place. There remain significant items that do need discussion; items which, by and large, were the victims of misinformation and misunderstanding during the provincial election. A first topic which lacked probing was the real cost and impact on public education of funding some independent schools. It was estimated that it would cost $400 million for the independent faithbased schools and their 53,000 students to join the public schools. But if it is the case that only half of Ontario’s independent faith-based schools would ultimately opt for this proposal, the figure would be more properly $200 million. Further, the number of students that this would add could then be estimated to be around 25 000. Yet, imagine if all 53 000 students attending faith-based schools (or even all 136,000 privately schooled students in the province) had attempted to enroll in their local public school in September. These are Ontarians who have as genuine a right to attend their local public school as anyone, but the real cost to the public system of these additions is not only largely unknown, but largely ignored. Second, an opportunity for robust conversation on the nature and importance of diversity for a society was missed. Could it be that an innovative and knowledge based economy requires innovation and diversity in the design and delivery of education? One could argue with some success that an educational model of diversity could provide social stimulation, innovation, and cultivation of profound intersections between different spheres and beliefs in society. Yet through their education policy proposals, both the Liberals and the Conservatives seemed to suggest that independent and non-conformist thinking is harmful for a society — a suggestion that a great deal of economic thinking would be quick to contest. Similarly, and thirdly, we have not discussed how the presence of independent schools cultivates accountability and competition which can improve Ontario public education. Different perspectives, methodologies and priorities in education keep a lively accountable conversation happening between public, Catholic and independent partners. McGuinty demonstrated as much when he vowed in 2004 to improve public education because increasing numbers of parents were leaving. Furthermore, Preston Manning has pointed out that despite having very similar per capita spending on education, Alberta consistently ranked higher than Ontario in primary and secondary education. He attributes this excellence to the greater diversity of education choices, more “freedom to choose” the best educational options for their children, and more resources to support these choices. A fourth point of discussion would be on the question of rights. Ontarians have long been aware that the United Nations has frowned upon the structure of Ontario’s educational system, as privileging specific faiths over and against others. But there is another rights question at work as well. Who has the right to select and determine how children will be educated? While the province of Ontario does not make public education mandatory, its distribution of finances carefully disciplines the kinds of educational choices that can be made by the majority of families in Ontario. So 94 percent of Ontario students and their families comply. Only six percent choose independent schools or homebased education, only half of which are faith-based choices. Yet does the province have no moral mandate to recognize these parents’ views and needs? Finally, the election became a platform for the growth of intolerance and suspicion when it could have become a debate on how to incorporate diverse but legitimate partners in the culture and society of the province of Ontario. A sad by-product of this campaign is that it became an exercise in religious intolerance. Unfortunately, a small but identifiable minority — comprised of mainly Christians, Jews and Muslims — has become the target of this. McGuinty’s devastating inference that faith-based schools encourage segregation, social unrest and division directly challenges the legitimacy of such minorities and their perspectives. The value of this opinion voiced in a careless campaign by a political leader holding the Office of Premier will quietly embed its troubled implications into our cultural ethos. Will graduates of such faith-based institutions be viewed as culturally suspect? Will families who choose such schools be increasingly regarded with apprehension? Will the Premier’s views hold sway despite research showing otherwise? The independent school community is civically engaged, publicly active, entrepreneurial, and family oriented. In April 2007, the present authors reported higher than average civic involvement in federal, provincial, and municipal elections by private school parents and also found that 40 percent of parents who choose private schools for their children are entrepreneurs compared to 7 percent of parents in the public schools. Additionally, Statistics Canada has recently found that religious families donate more money and volunteer more time than the general population to social service organizations. If independent school communities are healthy communities, and their supporting families are making significant contributions to the social and economic health of our society, suggestions of their being the source of social upheaval can hardly be accurate. Not only did Ontarians miss the opportunity to discuss the impact and potential of educational diversity in this last election, it failed to robustly discuss the proposal that was offered. Careful research can be difficult to achieve on a campaign trail, but surely with election politics comfortably behind us Ontario can begin to imagine more creative solutions to the problems with education in this province, to the benefit of all students, and to the health and prosperity of this province.   Michael Van Pelt is president and Ray Pennings is vice president of the Work Research Foundation, Hamilton, Ontario. Deani Van Pelt is an assistant professor in the Department of Education at Redeemer University College, Ancaster, Ontario.